1200KM / sigma-rule
ASLR Disabled Via Sysctl or Direct Syscall - Linux — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule e497a24e-9345-4a62-9803-b06d7d7cb132. ASLR Disabled Via Sysctl or Direct Syscall - Linux — Sigma Rule. Detects actions that disable Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) in Linux, including: - Use of the `personality` syscall with the ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE flag (0x0040000) - Modification of the /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space file - Execution of the `sysctl` command to set `kernel.randomize_va_space=0` Disabling ASLR is often used by attackers during exploit development or to bypass memory protection mechanisms. A successful use of these methods can reduce the effectiveness of ASLR and make memory corruption attacks more reliable.
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Milad Cheraghi. Source status: experimental; severity: high. Source dates: 2025-05-26 / 2025-12-05.
{
"product": "linux",
"service": "auditd"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: 8cb6126e08ec525a251233123bd6eda62e160dbf14490c0834a53d4bfcf0d8ee
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: ASLR Disabled Via Sysctl or Direct Syscall - Linux
id: e497a24e-9345-4a62-9803-b06d7d7cb132
status: experimental
description: |
Detects actions that disable Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) in Linux, including:
- Use of the `personality` syscall with the ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE flag (0x0040000)
- Modification of the /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space file
- Execution of the `sysctl` command to set `kernel.randomize_va_space=0`
Disabling ASLR is often used by attackers during exploit development or to bypass memory protection mechanisms.
A successful use of these methods can reduce the effectiveness of ASLR and make memory corruption attacks more reliable.
references:
- https://github.com/CheraghiMilad/bypass-Neo23x0-auditd-config/blob/f1c478a37911a5447d5ffcd580f22b167bf3df14/personality-syscall/README.md
- https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/personality.2.html
- https://manual.cs50.io/2/personality
- https://linux-audit.com/linux-aslr-and-kernelrandomize_va_space-setting/
author: Milad Cheraghi
date: 2025-05-26
modified: 2025-12-05
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.stealth
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685
- attack.t1055.009
logsource:
product: linux
service: auditd
detection:
selection_syscall:
type: 'SYSCALL'
SYSCALL: 'personality'
a0: 40000
selection_sysctl:
type: 'EXECVE'
a0: 'sysctl'
a1: '-w'
a2: 'kernel.randomize_va_space=0' # 0 = disable
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Debugging or legitimate software testing
level: high
False positives
- Debugging or legitimate software testing
Source references
- https://github.com/CheraghiMilad/bypass-Neo23x0-auditd-config/blob/f1c478a37911a5447d5ffcd580f22b167bf3df14/personality-syscall/README.md
- https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/personality.2.html
- https://manual.cs50.io/2/personality
- https://linux-audit.com/linux-aslr-and-kernelrandomize_va_space-setting/
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.