1200KM / sigma-rule
Suspicious Creation with Colorcpl — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule e15b518d-b4ce-4410-a9cd-501f23ce4a18. Suspicious Creation with Colorcpl — Sigma Rule. Once executed, colorcpl.exe will copy the arbitrary file to c:\windows\system32\spool\drivers\color\
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: frack113. Source status: test; severity: high. Source dates: 2022-01-21 / 2023-01-05.
{
"product": "windows",
"category": "file_event"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: 306cae1a63bc4baa74420ef4933744eefe1b6a7002625938fdf8b9d664bd98d7
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Suspicious Creation with Colorcpl
id: e15b518d-b4ce-4410-a9cd-501f23ce4a18
status: test
description: Once executed, colorcpl.exe will copy the arbitrary file to c:\windows\system32\spool\drivers\color\
references:
- https://twitter.com/eral4m/status/1480468728324231172?s=20
author: frack113
date: 2022-01-21
modified: 2023-01-05
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1564
logsource:
product: windows
category: file_event
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: '\colorcpl.exe'
filter_ext:
TargetFilename|endswith:
- '.icm'
- '.gmmp'
- '.cdmp'
- '.camp'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
False positives
- Unknown
Source references
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.