1200KM / sigma-rule
Potentially Suspicious Child Processes Spawned by ConHost — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule dfa03a09-8b92-4d83-8e74-f72839b1c407. Potentially Suspicious Child Processes Spawned by ConHost — Sigma Rule. Detects suspicious child processes related to Windows Shell utilities spawned by `conhost.exe`, which could indicate malicious activity using trusted system components.
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems). Source status: experimental; severity: high. Source dates: 2025-02-05 / not supplied.
{
"category": "process_creation",
"product": "windows"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: cbd77556fd15c351d3b9ea7b124b798b4928e61527cb9cba4ece9729141a6be3
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Potentially Suspicious Child Processes Spawned by ConHost
id: dfa03a09-8b92-4d83-8e74-f72839b1c407
related:
- id: 7dc2dedd-7603-461a-bc13-15803d132355
type: similar
status: experimental
description: Detects suspicious child processes related to Windows Shell utilities spawned by `conhost.exe`, which could indicate malicious activity using trusted system components.
references:
- https://tria.ge/241015-l98snsyeje/behavioral2
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-02-05
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1202
- attack.t1218
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_parent:
ParentImage|endswith: '\conhost.exe'
selection_child:
- Image|endswith:
- '\cmd.exe' # Windows Command Prompt
- '\cscript.exe' # Windows Script Host (used for scripting exploits)
- '\mshta.exe' # MSHTA (HTML Application Host, often abused)
- '\powershell_ise.exe' # PowerShell ISE
- '\powershell.exe' # Windows PowerShell
- '\pwsh.exe' # PowerShell Core
- '\regsvr32.exe' # Windows Registry Server (commonly used for exploits)
- '\wscript.exe' # Windows Script Host (for executing scripts)
- OriginalFileName:
- 'cmd.exe'
- 'cscript.exe'
- 'mshta.exe'
- 'powershell_ise.exe'
- 'powershell.exe'
- 'pwsh.dll'
- 'regsvr32.exe'
- 'wscript.exe'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administrative tasks using `conhost.exe` to spawn child processes such as `cmd.exe`, `powershell.exe`, or `regsvr32.exe`.
level: high
False positives
- Legitimate administrative tasks using `conhost.exe` to spawn child processes such as `cmd.exe`, `powershell.exe`, or `regsvr32.exe`.
Source references
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.