Suspicious Non PowerShell WSMAN COM Provider — Sigma Rule

Rule metadata and linked tags

Author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research). Source status: test; severity: medium. Source dates: 2020-06-24 / 2025-10-22.

{
  "product": "windows",
  "service": "powershell-classic"
}

Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1

Source SHA-256: 7fd60d2d0e4d19a94cc0b68e8f15c7cf4d75595b5d8d0a3735772e460ab6a667

Detection logic

Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.

title: Suspicious Non PowerShell WSMAN COM Provider
id: df9a0e0e-fedb-4d6c-8668-d765dfc92aa7
status: test
description: Detects suspicious use of the WSMAN provider without PowerShell.exe as the host application.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/chadtilbury/status/1275851297770610688
    - https://bohops.com/2020/05/12/ws-management-com-another-approach-for-winrm-lateral-movement/
    - https://github.com/bohops/WSMan-WinRM
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
date: 2020-06-24
modified: 2025-10-22
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: powershell-classic
detection:
    selection:
        Data|contains: 'ProviderName=WSMan'
    filter_main_ps:
        Data|contains:
            - 'HostApplication=powershell'
            - 'HostApplication=C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell'
            - 'HostApplication=C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell'
            # In some cases powershell was invoked with inverted slashes
            - 'HostApplication=C:/Windows/System32/WindowsPowerShell/v1.0/powershell'
            - 'HostApplication=C:/Windows/SysWOW64/WindowsPowerShell/v1.0/powershell'
    filter_main_host_application_null:
        # Note: Since we're using the raw data field to match. There is no easy way to filter out cases where the "HostApplication" field is null (i.e doesn't exist). We're practically forced to use a regex.
        # If you're already mapping and extracting the field, then obviously use that directly.
        Data|re: 'HostId=[a-zA-Z0-9-]{36}\s+EngineVersion='
    filter_optional_hexnode:
        Data|contains: 'HostApplication=C:\Hexnode\Hexnode Agent\Current\HexnodeAgent.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

Original YAML and metadata in JSON

False positives

• Unknown

Source references

• https://twitter.com/chadtilbury/status/1275851297770610688
• https://bohops.com/2020/05/12/ws-management-com-another-approach-for-winrm-lateral-movement/
• https://github.com/bohops/WSMan-WinRM