1200KM / sigma-rule
Process Explorer Driver Creation By Non-Sysinternals Binary — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule de46c52b-0bf8-4936-a327-aace94f94ac6. Process Explorer Driver Creation By Non-Sysinternals Binary — Sigma Rule. Detects creation of the Process Explorer drivers by processes other than Process Explorer (procexp) itself. Hack tools or malware may use the Process Explorer driver to elevate privileges, drops it to disk for a few moments, runs a service using that driver and removes it afterwards.
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems). Source status: test; severity: high. Source dates: 2023-05-05 / not supplied.
{
"product": "windows",
"category": "file_event"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: a22fd85e858b036f47cbb7699839ac65bb6f6a4536118d2c67c92b316fd0124a
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Process Explorer Driver Creation By Non-Sysinternals Binary
id: de46c52b-0bf8-4936-a327-aace94f94ac6
status: test
description: |
Detects creation of the Process Explorer drivers by processes other than Process Explorer (procexp) itself.
Hack tools or malware may use the Process Explorer driver to elevate privileges, drops it to disk for a few moments, runs a service using that driver and removes it afterwards.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/process-explorer
- https://github.com/Yaxser/Backstab
- https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/stopping-vulnerable-driver-attacks
- https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2023/04/19/aukill-edr-killer-malware-abuses-process-explorer-driver/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-05
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1068
logsource:
product: windows
category: file_event
detection:
selection:
TargetFilename|contains: '\PROCEXP'
TargetFilename|endswith: '.sys'
filter_main_process_explorer:
Image|endswith:
- '\procexp.exe'
- '\procexp64.exe'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Some false positives may occur with legitimate renamed process explorer binaries
level: high
False positives
- Some false positives may occur with legitimate renamed process explorer binaries
Source references
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.