1200KM / sigma-rule
Potential Defense Evasion Via Raw Disk Access By Uncommon Tools — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule db809f10-56ce-4420-8c86-d6a7d793c79c. Potential Defense Evasion Via Raw Disk Access By Uncommon Tools — Sigma Rule. Detects raw disk access using uncommon tools or tools that are located in suspicious locations (heavy filtering is required), which could indicate possible defense evasion attempts
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov, oscd.community. Source status: test; severity: low. Source dates: 2019-10-22 / 2025-12-03.
{
"product": "windows",
"category": "raw_access_thread"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: 4036d2a68c163f608433bc050b413f20527a16215766077e762ddd3a47e650ac
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Potential Defense Evasion Via Raw Disk Access By Uncommon Tools
id: db809f10-56ce-4420-8c86-d6a7d793c79c
status: test
description: Detects raw disk access using uncommon tools or tools that are located in suspicious locations (heavy filtering is required), which could indicate possible defense evasion attempts
references:
- https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment
author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov, oscd.community
date: 2019-10-22
modified: 2025-12-03
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1006
logsource:
product: windows
category: raw_access_thread
detection:
filter_main_floppy:
Device|contains: floppy
filter_main_generic:
Image|startswith:
- 'C:\$WINDOWS.~BT\'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\'
- 'C:\Program Files\'
- 'C:\Windows\CCM\'
- 'C:\Windows\explorer.exe'
- 'C:\Windows\servicing\'
- 'C:\Windows\SoftwareDistribution\'
- 'C:\Windows\System32\'
- 'C:\Windows\SystemApps\'
- 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\'
- 'C:\Windows\uus\'
- 'C:\Windows\WinSxS\'
filter_main_system_images:
Image:
- 'Registry'
- 'System'
filter_main_windefender:
Image|startswith: 'C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\'
Image|endswith:
- '\MsMpEng.exe'
- '\MpDefenderCoreService.exe'
filter_main_microsoft_appdata:
Image|startswith: 'C:\Users\'
Image|contains|all:
- '\AppData\'
- '\Microsoft\'
filter_main_ssd_nvme:
Image|startswith: 'C:\Windows\Temp\'
Image|endswith:
- '\Executables\SSDUpdate.exe'
- '\HostMetadata\NVMEHostmetadata.exe'
filter_main_null:
Image: null
filter_main_systemsettings:
Image: 'C:\Windows\ImmersiveControlPanel\SystemSettings.exe'
filter_main_update:
Image|startswith: 'C:\$WinREAgent\Scratch\'
filter_optional_github_desktop:
Image|startswith: 'C:\Users\'
Image|contains: '\AppData\Local\GitHubDesktop\app-'
Image|endswith: '\resources\app\git\mingw64\bin\git.exe'
filter_optional_nextron:
Image|startswith: 'C:\Windows\Temp\asgard2-agent\'
Image|endswith: '\thor.exe'
filter_optional_Keybase:
Image|startswith: 'C:\Users\'
Image|contains: '\AppData\Local\Keybase\upd.exe'
condition: not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
- Likely
level: low
False positives
- Likely
Source references
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.