1200kmSECURITY RESEARCH

1200KM / sigma-rule

CobaltStrike Service Installations - Security — Sigma Rule

Sigma rule d7a95147-145f-4678-b85d-d1ff4a3bb3f6. CobaltStrike Service Installations - Security — Sigma Rule. Detects known malicious service installs that appear in cases in which a Cobalt Strike beacon elevates privileges or lateral movement

Rule metadata and linked tags

Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Wojciech Lesicki. Source status: test; severity: high. Source dates: 2021-05-26 / 2022-11-27.

{
  "product": "windows",
  "service": "security",
  "definition": "The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697"
}

Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1

Source SHA-256: 6e5a67db862c48342750e76203ee45dced8b802462bed83da6df944ed39e7697

Detection logic

Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.

title: CobaltStrike Service Installations - Security
id: d7a95147-145f-4678-b85d-d1ff4a3bb3f6
related:
    - id: 5a105d34-05fc-401e-8553-272b45c1522d
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects known malicious service installs that appear in cases in which a Cobalt Strike beacon elevates privileges or lateral movement
references:
    - https://www.sans.org/webcasts/119395
    - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/getting-the-bacon-from-cobalt-strike-beacon/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/08/29/cobalt-strike-a-defenders-guide/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Wojciech Lesicki
date: 2021-05-26
modified: 2022-11-27
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
    - attack.t1543.003
    - attack.t1569.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
    event_id:
        EventID: 4697
    selection1:
        ServiceFileName|contains|all:
            - 'ADMIN$'
            - '.exe'
    selection2:
        ServiceFileName|contains|all:
            - '%COMSPEC%'
            - 'start'
            - 'powershell'
    selection3:
        ServiceFileName|contains: 'powershell -nop -w hidden -encodedcommand'
    selection4:
        ServiceFileName|base64offset|contains: "IEX (New-Object Net.Webclient).DownloadString('http://127.0.0.1:"
    condition: event_id and 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Original YAML and metadata in JSON

False positives

  • Unknown

Source references

Connected ecosystem references

Exact source-tagged techniques

Telemetry review

Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.

Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.