1200KM / sigma-rule
Potential Vcruntime140 DLL Sideloading — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule d7a63acb-1284-49bc-bfea-7771146c8b1c. Potential Vcruntime140 DLL Sideloading — Sigma Rule. Detects potential DLL sideloading of vcruntime140.dll, a common C++ runtime library. Threat actors have been observed using DLL sideloading techniques to load malicious payloads under the guise of legitimate applications such as SqlWriter, SqlDumper etc. Notably, APT29 has been documented leveraging WinELOADER to sideload vcruntime140.dll for executing malicious code.
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems). Source status: experimental; severity: high. Source dates: 2026-01-12 / 2026-05-18.
{
"category": "image_load",
"product": "windows"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: f56054e386eab3d8aeeef57dd255606acb262dc718cb0f0527234e7d14b39393
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Potential Vcruntime140 DLL Sideloading
id: d7a63acb-1284-49bc-bfea-7771146c8b1c
status: experimental
description: |
Detects potential DLL sideloading of vcruntime140.dll, a common C++ runtime library.
Threat actors have been observed using DLL sideloading techniques to load malicious payloads under the guise of legitimate applications such as SqlWriter, SqlDumper etc.
Notably, APT29 has been documented leveraging WinELOADER to sideload vcruntime140.dll for executing malicious code.
references:
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/apt29-wineloader-german-political-parties
- https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/european-diplomats-targeted-spikedwine-wineloader
- https://www.nextron-systems.com/2023/09/15/detecting-janelarat-with-yara-and-thor/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2026-01-12
modified: 2026-05-18
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.execution
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1574.001
logsource:
category: image_load
product: windows
detection:
selection:
ImageLoaded|endswith: '\vcruntime140.dll'
filter_main_legitimate_path:
ImageLoaded|startswith:
- 'C:\Windows\System32\'
- 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\'
- 'C:\Program Files\'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\'
filter_main_legitimate_signer:
Signed: true
SignatureStatus: 'Valid'
Description|endswith: 'C Runtime Library'
filter_optional_onedrive:
Image|startswith: 'C:\Users\'
Image|contains: '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\OneDrive\'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_side_load_vcruntime140/info.yml
False positives
- Unknown
Source references
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.