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Suspicious ClickFix/FileFix Execution Pattern — Sigma Rule

Sigma rule d487ed4a-fd24-436d-a0b2-f4e95f7b2635. Suspicious ClickFix/FileFix Execution Pattern — Sigma Rule. Detects suspicious execution patterns where users are tricked into running malicious commands via clipboard manipulation, either through the Windows Run dialog (ClickFix) or File Explorer address bar (FileFix). Attackers leverage social engineering campaigns—such as fake CAPTCHA challenges or urgent alerts—encouraging victims to paste clipboard contents, often executing mshta.exe, powershell.exe, or similar commands to infect systems.

Rule metadata and linked tags

Author: montysecurity, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems). Source status: experimental; severity: high. Source dates: 2025-11-19 / not supplied.

{
  "category": "process_creation",
  "product": "windows"
}

Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1

Source SHA-256: 1be41e59cb4fe10f8029110aa0b9041d328077b327ad4ff8f9718b7a8e7490ef

Detection logic

Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.

title: Suspicious ClickFix/FileFix Execution Pattern
id: d487ed4a-fd24-436d-a0b2-f4e95f7b2635
related:
    - id: f5fe36cf-f1ec-4c23-903d-09a3110f6bbb
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects suspicious execution patterns where users are tricked into running malicious commands via clipboard manipulation, either through the Windows Run dialog (ClickFix) or File Explorer address bar (FileFix).
    Attackers leverage social engineering campaigns—such as fake CAPTCHA challenges or urgent alerts—encouraging victims to paste clipboard contents, often executing mshta.exe, powershell.exe, or similar commands to infect systems.
references:
    - https://github.com/JohnHammond/recaptcha-phish
    - https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/deepseek-lure-using-captchas-spread-malware
    - https://www.threatdown.com/blog/clipboard-hijacker-tries-to-install-a-trojan/
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/5c16b4db-4b36-4039-a0ed-9b09abff8be2
    - https://www.esentire.com/security-advisories/netsupport-rat-clickfix-distribution
    - https://www.scpx.com.au/2025/11/16/decades-old-finger-protocol-abused-in-clickfix-malware-attacks/ # filefix variant
author: montysecurity, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-11-19
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.001
    - attack.t1204.004
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\explorer.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: '#'
    selection_cli_captcha:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'account'
            - 'anti-bot'
            - 'botcheck'
            - 'captcha'
            - 'challenge'
            - 'confirmation'
            - 'fraud'
            - 'human'
            - 'identification'
            - 'identificator'
            - 'identity'
            - 'robot'
            - 'validation'
            - 'verification'
            - 'verify'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

Original YAML and metadata in JSON

False positives

  • Unlikely

Source references

Connected ecosystem references

Exact source-tagged techniques

Telemetry review

Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.

Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.