1200KM / sigma-rule
PUA - RemCom Default Named Pipe — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule d36f87ea-c403-44d2-aa79-1a0ac7c24456. PUA - RemCom Default Named Pipe — Sigma Rule. Detects default RemCom pipe creation
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems). Source status: test; severity: medium. Source dates: 2023-08-07 / 2023-11-30.
{
"product": "windows",
"category": "pipe_created",
"definition": "Note that you have to configure logging for Named Pipe Events in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18). The basic configuration is in popular sysmon configuration (https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config), but it is worth verifying. You can also use other repo, e.g. https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config, https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular. How to test detection? You can check powershell script from this site https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: 348ff33823b219475fc405ac9bb1934572888c8013cce9c50f488da5abef08f0
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: PUA - RemCom Default Named Pipe
id: d36f87ea-c403-44d2-aa79-1a0ac7c24456
related:
- id: 9e77ed63-2ecf-4c7b-b09d-640834882028
type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects default RemCom pipe creation
references:
- https://drive.google.com/file/d/1lKya3_mLnR3UQuCoiYruO3qgu052_iS_/view
- https://github.com/kavika13/RemCom
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-08-07
modified: 2023-11-30
tags:
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.t1021.002
- attack.execution
- attack.t1569.002
logsource:
product: windows
category: pipe_created
definition: 'Note that you have to configure logging for Named Pipe Events in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18). The basic configuration is in popular sysmon configuration (https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config), but it is worth verifying. You can also use other repo, e.g. https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config, https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular. How to test detection? You can check powershell script from this site https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575'
detection:
selection:
PipeName|contains: '\RemCom'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate Administrator activity
level: medium
False positives
- Legitimate Administrator activity
Source references
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.