1200KM / sigma-rule
Potential DLL Sideloading Of KeyScramblerIE.DLL Via KeyScrambler.EXE — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule d2451be2-b582-4e15-8701-4196ac180260. Potential DLL Sideloading Of KeyScramblerIE.DLL Via KeyScrambler.EXE — Sigma Rule. Detects potential DLL side loading of "KeyScramblerIE.dll" by "KeyScrambler.exe". Various threat actors and malware have been found side loading a masqueraded "KeyScramblerIE.dll" through "KeyScrambler.exe".
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel. Source status: test; severity: high. Source dates: 2024-04-15 / not supplied.
{
"category": "image_load",
"product": "windows"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: e9fd7bf541363cbc8d26e56c0b9a42e3ef96dcd5ebee165789d69be7ef809b4d
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Potential DLL Sideloading Of KeyScramblerIE.DLL Via KeyScrambler.EXE
id: d2451be2-b582-4e15-8701-4196ac180260
related:
- id: ca5583e9-8f80-46ac-ab91-7f314d13b984
type: similar
status: test
description: |
Detects potential DLL side loading of "KeyScramblerIE.dll" by "KeyScrambler.exe".
Various threat actors and malware have been found side loading a masqueraded "KeyScramblerIE.dll" through "KeyScrambler.exe".
references:
- https://thehackernews.com/2024/03/two-chinese-apt-groups-ramp-up-cyber.html
- https://csirt-cti.net/2024/02/01/stately-taurus-continued-new-information-on-cyberespionage-attacks-against-myanmar-military-junta/
- https://bazaar.abuse.ch/sample/5cb9876681f78d3ee8a01a5aaa5d38b05ec81edc48b09e3865b75c49a2187831/
- https://twitter.com/Max_Mal_/status/1775222576639291859
- https://twitter.com/DTCERT/status/1712785426895839339
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
date: 2024-04-15
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.execution
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1574.001
logsource:
category: image_load
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith:
- '\KeyScrambler.exe'
- '\KeyScramblerLogon.exe'
ImageLoaded|endswith: '\KeyScramblerIE.dll'
filter_main_legitimate_path:
Image|contains:
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\KeyScrambler\'
- 'C:\Program Files\KeyScrambler\'
ImageLoaded|contains:
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\KeyScrambler\'
- 'C:\Program Files\KeyScrambler\'
filter_main_signature:
Signature: 'QFX Software Corporation'
SignatureStatus: 'Valid'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
False positives
- Unknown
Source references
- https://thehackernews.com/2024/03/two-chinese-apt-groups-ramp-up-cyber.html
- https://csirt-cti.net/2024/02/01/stately-taurus-continued-new-information-on-cyberespionage-attacks-against-myanmar-military-junta/
- https://bazaar.abuse.ch/sample/5cb9876681f78d3ee8a01a5aaa5d38b05ec81edc48b09e3865b75c49a2187831/
- https://twitter.com/Max_Mal_/status/1775222576639291859
- https://twitter.com/DTCERT/status/1712785426895839339
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.