1200KM / sigma-rule
Conhost Spawned By Uncommon Parent Process — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule cbb9e3d1-2386-4e59-912e-62f1484f7a89. Conhost Spawned By Uncommon Parent Process — Sigma Rule. Detects when the Console Window Host (conhost.exe) process is spawned by an uncommon parent process, which could be indicative of potential code injection activity.
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Tim Rauch, Elastic (idea). Source status: test; severity: medium. Source dates: 2022-09-28 / 2025-03-06.
{
"category": "process_creation",
"product": "windows"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: 3a4cd3f28002b84c60e91450e161da6353103c49b6a174f1d85b77244144b7a2
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Conhost Spawned By Uncommon Parent Process
id: cbb9e3d1-2386-4e59-912e-62f1484f7a89
status: test
description: Detects when the Console Window Host (conhost.exe) process is spawned by an uncommon parent process, which could be indicative of potential code injection activity.
references:
- https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/conhost-spawned-by-suspicious-parent-process.html
author: Tim Rauch, Elastic (idea)
date: 2022-09-28
modified: 2025-03-06
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: '\conhost.exe'
ParentImage|endswith:
- '\explorer.exe'
# - '\csrss.exe' # Legitimate parent as seen in EchoTrail https://www.echotrail.io/insights/search/csrss.exe
# - '\ctfmon.exe' # Seen several times in a testing environment
# - '\dllhost.exe' # FP on clean system from grandparent 'svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p'
- '\lsass.exe'
- '\regsvr32.exe'
- '\rundll32.exe'
- '\services.exe'
- '\smss.exe'
- '\spoolsv.exe'
- '\svchost.exe'
- '\userinit.exe'
# - '\wermgr.exe' # Legitimate parent as seen in EchoTrail https://www.echotrail.io/insights/search/wermgr.exe
- '\wininit.exe'
- '\winlogon.exe'
filter_main_svchost:
ParentCommandLine|contains:
- '-k apphost -s AppHostSvc'
- '-k imgsvc'
- '-k localService -p -s RemoteRegistry'
- '-k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s NgcSvc'
- '-k NetSvcs -p -s NcaSvc'
- '-k netsvcs -p -s NetSetupSvc'
- '-k netsvcs -p -s wlidsvc'
- '-k NetworkService -p -s DoSvc'
- '-k wsappx -p -s AppXSvc'
- '-k wsappx -p -s ClipSVC'
- '-k wusvcs -p -s WaaSMedicSvc'
filter_optional_dropbox:
ParentCommandLine|contains:
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Dropbox\Client\'
- 'C:\Program Files\Dropbox\Client\'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
False positives
- Unknown
Source references
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.