1200KM / sigma-rule
Monitoring For Persistence Via BITS — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule b9cbbc17-d00d-4e3d-a827-b06d03d2380d. Monitoring For Persistence Via BITS — Sigma Rule. BITS will allow you to schedule a command to execute after a successful download to notify you that the job is finished. When the job runs on the system the command specified in the BITS job will be executed. This can be abused by actors to create a backdoor within the system and for persistence. It will be chained in a BITS job to schedule the download of malware/additional binaries and execute the program after being downloaded.
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Sreeman. Source status: test; severity: medium. Source dates: 2020-10-29 / 2024-01-25.
{
"product": "windows",
"category": "process_creation"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: 51ddb3daea64948a147f3adb583019176db93af85ad04eb19f1397daf3425867
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Monitoring For Persistence Via BITS
id: b9cbbc17-d00d-4e3d-a827-b06d03d2380d
status: test
description: |
BITS will allow you to schedule a command to execute after a successful download to notify you that the job is finished.
When the job runs on the system the command specified in the BITS job will be executed.
This can be abused by actors to create a backdoor within the system and for persistence.
It will be chained in a BITS job to schedule the download of malware/additional binaries and execute the program after being downloaded.
references:
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/kegtap-and-singlemalt-with-a-ransomware-chaser.html
- http://0xthem.blogspot.com/2014/03/t-emporal-persistence-with-and-schtasks.html
- https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Wipe+the+drive+Stealthy+Malware+Persistence+Mechanism+-+Part+1/15394
author: Sreeman
date: 2020-10-29
modified: 2024-01-25
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.execution
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1197
logsource:
product: windows
category: process_creation
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\bitsadmin.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'bitsadmin.exe'
selection_cli_notify_1:
CommandLine|contains: '/SetNotifyCmdLine'
selection_cli_notify_2:
CommandLine|contains:
- '%COMSPEC%'
- 'cmd.exe'
- 'regsvr32.exe'
selection_cli_add_1:
CommandLine|contains: '/Addfile'
selection_cli_add_2:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'http:'
- 'https:'
- 'ftp:'
- 'ftps:'
condition: selection_img and (all of selection_cli_notify_* or all of selection_cli_add_*)
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
False positives
- Unknown
Source references
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.