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DLL Search Order Hijackig Via Additional Space in Path — Sigma Rule

Sigma rule b6f91281-20aa-446a-b986-38a92813a18f. DLL Search Order Hijackig Via Additional Space in Path — Sigma Rule. Detects when an attacker create a similar folder structure to windows system folders such as (Windows, Program Files...) but with a space in order to trick DLL load search order and perform a "DLL Search Order Hijacking" attack

Rule metadata and linked tags

Author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems). Source status: test; severity: high. Source dates: 2022-07-30 / not supplied.

{
  "category": "file_event",
  "product": "windows"
}

Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1

Source SHA-256: 815a35743eb374c8d5e8b7e93eabae1036f2f3795c70f30d92da8122ba0924ff

Detection logic

Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.

title: DLL Search Order Hijackig Via Additional Space in Path
id: b6f91281-20aa-446a-b986-38a92813a18f
status: test
description: |
    Detects when an attacker create a similar folder structure to windows system folders such as (Windows, Program Files...)
    but with a space in order to trick DLL load search order and perform a "DLL Search Order Hijacking" attack
references:
    - https://twitter.com/cyb3rops/status/1552932770464292864
    - https://www.wietzebeukema.nl/blog/hijacking-dlls-in-windows
author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-30
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574.001
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|startswith:
            - 'C:\Windows \'
            - 'C:\Program Files \'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86) \'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Original YAML and metadata in JSON

False positives

  • Unknown

Source references

Connected ecosystem references

Exact source-tagged techniques

Telemetry review

Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.

Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.