1200KM / sigma-rule
Unsigned DLL Loaded by Windows Utility — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule b5de0c9a-6f19-43e0-af4e-55ad01f550af. Unsigned DLL Loaded by Windows Utility — Sigma Rule. Detects windows utilities loading an unsigned or untrusted DLL. Adversaries often abuse those programs to proxy execution of malicious code.
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel. Source status: test; severity: medium. Source dates: 2024-02-28 / 2025-10-07.
{
"product": "windows",
"category": "image_load"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: f54ed399511474f551543e98ee2383f646761f1323413ea753624d0d01ff125b
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Unsigned DLL Loaded by Windows Utility
id: b5de0c9a-6f19-43e0-af4e-55ad01f550af
status: test
description: |
Detects windows utilities loading an unsigned or untrusted DLL.
Adversaries often abuse those programs to proxy execution of malicious code.
references:
- https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/Hunting-for-Suspicious-Windows-Libraries-for-Execution-and-Evasion
- https://akhere.hashnode.dev/hunting-unsigned-dlls-using-kql
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unsigned-dlls/?web_view=true
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
date: 2024-02-28
modified: 2025-10-07
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1218.011
- attack.t1218.010
logsource:
product: windows
category: image_load
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith:
# Note: Add additional utilities that allow the loading of DLLs
- '\InstallUtil.exe'
- '\RegAsm.exe'
- '\RegSvcs.exe'
- '\regsvr32.exe'
- '\rundll32.exe'
filter_main_signed:
Signed: 'true'
filter_main_sig_status:
SignatureStatus:
- 'errorChaining'
- 'errorCode_endpoint'
- 'errorExpired'
- 'trusted'
- 'Valid'
filter_main_signed_null:
Signed: null
filter_main_signed_empty:
Signed:
- ''
- '-'
filter_main_sig_status_null:
SignatureStatus: null
filter_main_sig_status_empty:
SignatureStatus:
- ''
- '-'
filter_main_windows_installer:
Image:
- 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe'
- 'C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe'
ImageLoaded|startswith: 'C:\Windows\Installer\'
ImageLoaded|endswith:
- '.tmp-\Microsoft.Deployment.WindowsInstaller.dll'
- '.tmp-\Avira.OE.Setup.CustomActions.dll'
filter_main_assembly:
Image|startswith:
- 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\'
- 'C:\Windows\System32\'
- 'C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64'
Image|endswith: '\RegAsm.exe'
ImageLoaded|endswith: '.dll'
ImageLoaded|startswith: 'C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages'
filter_optional_klite_codec:
Image:
- 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\regsvr32.exe'
- 'C:\Windows\System32\regsvr32.exe'
ImageLoaded|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\K-Lite Codec Pack\'
- 'C:\Program Files\K-Lite Codec Pack\'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
False positives
- Unknown
Source references
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.