1200KM / sigma-rule
Self Extracting Package Creation Via Iexpress.EXE From Potentially Suspicious Location — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule b2b048b0-7857-4380-b0fb-d3f0ab820b71. Self Extracting Package Creation Via Iexpress.EXE From Potentially Suspicious Location — Sigma Rule. Detects the use of iexpress.exe to create binaries via Self Extraction Directive (SED) files located in potentially suspicious locations. This behavior has been observed in-the-wild by different threat actors.
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Joseliyo Sanchez, @Joseliyo_Jstnk, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems). Source status: test; severity: high. Source dates: 2024-02-05 / 2024-06-04.
{
"category": "process_creation",
"product": "windows"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: 5319410ec73a2f15e7702d6591ec5334a42775badd9679d7edb056ebacd4440a
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Self Extracting Package Creation Via Iexpress.EXE From Potentially Suspicious Location
id: b2b048b0-7857-4380-b0fb-d3f0ab820b71
status: test
description: |
Detects the use of iexpress.exe to create binaries via Self Extraction Directive (SED) files located in potentially suspicious locations.
This behavior has been observed in-the-wild by different threat actors.
references:
- https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/iexpress.exe-D594B2A33EFAFD0EABF09E3FDC05FCEA.html
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IExpress
- https://decoded.avast.io/janvojtesek/raspberry-robins-roshtyak-a-little-lesson-in-trickery/
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/602f4ae507fa8de57ada079adff25a6c2a899bd25cd092d0af7e62cdb619c93c/behavior
author: Joseliyo Sanchez, @Joseliyo_Jstnk, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2024-02-05
modified: 2024-06-04
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1218
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
# VT Query: behavior_processes:"iexpress.exe" and behavior_processes:"/n /q /m" and behavior_processes:"*.sed*" and p:5+
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\iexpress.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'IEXPRESS.exe'
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains|windash: ' /n '
selection_paths:
CommandLine|contains:
# Note: Add more uncommon paths that fit your organizational needs.
- ':\ProgramData\'
- ':\Temp\'
- ':\Windows\System32\Tasks\'
- ':\Windows\Tasks\'
- ':\Windows\Temp\'
- '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Administrators building packages using iexpress.exe
level: high
False positives
- Administrators building packages using iexpress.exe
Source references
- https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/iexpress.exe-D594B2A33EFAFD0EABF09E3FDC05FCEA.html
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IExpress
- https://decoded.avast.io/janvojtesek/raspberry-robins-roshtyak-a-little-lesson-in-trickery/
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/602f4ae507fa8de57ada079adff25a6c2a899bd25cd092d0af7e62cdb619c93c/behavior
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.