1200KM / sigma-rule
Proxy Execution Via Wuauclt.EXE — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule af77cf95-c469-471c-b6a0-946c685c4798. Proxy Execution Via Wuauclt.EXE — Sigma Rule. Detects the use of the Windows Update Client binary (wuauclt.exe) for proxy execution.
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Sreeman, FPT.EagleEye Team. Source status: test; severity: high. Source dates: 2020-10-12 / 2023-11-11.
{
"category": "process_creation",
"product": "windows"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: d50f5048c54d3b1aa040a89233e6adb6c6a7ca849850ea6564329f1ce1eec1c8
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Proxy Execution Via Wuauclt.EXE
id: af77cf95-c469-471c-b6a0-946c685c4798
related:
- id: ba1bb0cb-73da-42de-ad3a-de10c643a5d0
type: obsolete
- id: d7825193-b70a-48a4-b992-8b5b3015cc11
type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects the use of the Windows Update Client binary (wuauclt.exe) for proxy execution.
references:
- https://dtm.uk/wuauclt/
- https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2022/01/north-koreas-lazarus-apt-leverages-windows-update-client-github-in-latest-campaign/
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Sreeman, FPT.EagleEye Team
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2023-11-11
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1218
- attack.execution
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\wuauclt.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'wuauclt.exe'
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'UpdateDeploymentProvider'
- 'RunHandlerComServer'
filter_main_generic:
# Note: Please enhance this if you find the full path
CommandLine|contains: ' /UpdateDeploymentProvider UpdateDeploymentProvider.dll '
filter_main_wuaueng:
# Note: Please enhance this if you find the full path
CommandLine|contains: ' wuaueng.dll '
filter_main_uus:
CommandLine|contains:
- ':\Windows\UUS\Packages\Preview\amd64\updatedeploy.dll /ClassId'
- ':\Windows\UUS\amd64\UpdateDeploy.dll /ClassId'
filter_main_winsxs:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- ':\Windows\WinSxS\'
- '\UpdateDeploy.dll /ClassId '
condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
False positives
- Unknown
Source references
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.