1200KM / sigma-rule
Launch Agent/Daemon Execution Via Launchctl — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule ae9d710f-dcd1-4f75-a0a5-93a73b5dda0e. Launch Agent/Daemon Execution Via Launchctl — Sigma Rule. Detects the execution of programs as Launch Agents or Launch Daemons using launchctl on macOS.
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Pratinav Chandra. Source status: test; severity: medium. Source dates: 2024-05-13 / not supplied.
{
"category": "process_creation",
"product": "macos"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: 335a4a0f8b2dd50193c6c7c96e3c75e13fcc74b40c6a0c6377653619fe9587dc
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Launch Agent/Daemon Execution Via Launchctl
id: ae9d710f-dcd1-4f75-a0a5-93a73b5dda0e
status: test
description: Detects the execution of programs as Launch Agents or Launch Daemons using launchctl on macOS.
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1569.001/T1569.001.md
- https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/07/16/mac-cryptocurrency-trading-application-rebranded-bundled-malware/
- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/18/d/new-macos-backdoor-linked-to-oceanlotus-found.html
- https://www.loobins.io/binaries/launchctl/
author: Pratinav Chandra
date: 2024-05-13
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.execution
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1569.001
- attack.t1543.001
- attack.t1543.004
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: macos
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: '/launchctl'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'submit'
- 'load'
- 'start'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administration activities is expected to trigger false positives. Investigate the command line being passed to determine if the service or launch agent are suspicious.
level: medium
False positives
- Legitimate administration activities is expected to trigger false positives. Investigate the command line being passed to determine if the service or launch agent are suspicious.
Source references
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1569.001/T1569.001.md
- https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/07/16/mac-cryptocurrency-trading-application-rebranded-bundled-malware/
- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/18/d/new-macos-backdoor-linked-to-oceanlotus-found.html
- https://www.loobins.io/binaries/launchctl/
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.