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Launch Agent/Daemon Execution Via Launchctl — Sigma Rule

Sigma rule ae9d710f-dcd1-4f75-a0a5-93a73b5dda0e. Launch Agent/Daemon Execution Via Launchctl — Sigma Rule. Detects the execution of programs as Launch Agents or Launch Daemons using launchctl on macOS.

Rule metadata and linked tags

Author: Pratinav Chandra. Source status: test; severity: medium. Source dates: 2024-05-13 / not supplied.

Original logsource
{
  "category": "process_creation",
  "product": "macos"
}

Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1

Source SHA-256: 335a4a0f8b2dd50193c6c7c96e3c75e13fcc74b40c6a0c6377653619fe9587dc

Detection logic

Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.

Original Sigma rule YAML, scroll horizontally if needed
title: Launch Agent/Daemon Execution Via Launchctl
id: ae9d710f-dcd1-4f75-a0a5-93a73b5dda0e
status: test
description: Detects the execution of programs as Launch Agents or Launch Daemons using launchctl on macOS.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1569.001/T1569.001.md
    - https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/
    - https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/07/16/mac-cryptocurrency-trading-application-rebranded-bundled-malware/
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/18/d/new-macos-backdoor-linked-to-oceanlotus-found.html
    - https://www.loobins.io/binaries/launchctl/
author: Pratinav Chandra
date: 2024-05-13
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1569.001
    - attack.t1543.001
    - attack.t1543.004
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: macos
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '/launchctl'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'submit'
            - 'load'
            - 'start'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administration activities is expected to trigger false positives. Investigate the command line being passed to determine if the service or launch agent are suspicious.
level: medium

Original YAML and metadata in JSON

False positives

  • Legitimate administration activities is expected to trigger false positives. Investigate the command line being passed to determine if the service or launch agent are suspicious.

Source references

Connected ecosystem references

Exact source-tagged techniques

Telemetry review

Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.

Pinned research references. No browser attack runner or production-validated detector is asserted. Imported procedures remain unvalidated; any bounded lab evidence has its own scope. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.