1200KM / sigma-rule
Scripting/CommandLine Process Spawned Regsvr32 — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule ab37a6ec-6068-432b-a64e-2c7bf95b1d22. Scripting/CommandLine Process Spawned Regsvr32 — Sigma Rule. Detects various command line and scripting engines/processes such as "PowerShell", "Wscript", "Cmd", etc. spawning a "regsvr32" instance.
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems). Source status: test; severity: medium. Source dates: 2023-05-26 / not supplied.
{
"category": "process_creation",
"product": "windows"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: 14ca4424714aceb1836053f17196e1bb347f9593f8f615e841d7971cc570a8bc
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Scripting/CommandLine Process Spawned Regsvr32
id: ab37a6ec-6068-432b-a64e-2c7bf95b1d22
related:
- id: 8e2b24c9-4add-46a0-b4bb-0057b4e6187d
type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects various command line and scripting engines/processes such as "PowerShell", "Wscript", "Cmd", etc. spawning a "regsvr32" instance.
references:
- https://web.archive.org/web/20171001085340/https://subt0x10.blogspot.com/2017/04/bypass-application-whitelisting-script.html
- https://app.any.run/tasks/34221348-072d-4b70-93f3-aa71f6ebecad/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-26
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1218.010
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
ParentImage|endswith:
- '\cmd.exe'
- '\cscript.exe'
- '\mshta.exe'
- '\powershell_ise.exe'
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- '\wscript.exe'
Image|endswith: '\regsvr32.exe'
filter_main_rpcproxy:
ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
CommandLine|endswith: ' /s C:\Windows\System32\RpcProxy\RpcProxy.dll'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate ".bat", ".hta", ".ps1" or ".vbs" scripts leverage legitimately often. Apply additional filter and exclusions as necessary
- Some legitimate Windows services
level: medium # Can be reduced to low if you experience a ton of FP
False positives
- Legitimate ".bat", ".hta", ".ps1" or ".vbs" scripts leverage legitimately often. Apply additional filter and exclusions as necessary
- Some legitimate Windows services
Source references
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.