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Potential RipZip Attack on Startup Folder — Sigma Rule

Sigma rule a6976974-ea6f-4e97-818e-ea08625c52cb. Potential RipZip Attack on Startup Folder — Sigma Rule. Detects a phishing attack which expands a ZIP file containing a malicious shortcut. If the victim expands the ZIP file via the explorer process, then the explorer process expands the malicious ZIP file and drops a malicious shortcut redirected to a backdoor into the Startup folder. Additionally, the file name of the malicious shortcut in Startup folder contains {0AFACED1-E828-11D1-9187-B532F1E9575D} meaning the folder shortcut operation.

Rule metadata and linked tags

Author: Greg (rule). Source status: test; severity: high. Source dates: 2022-07-21 / 2023-01-05.

{
  "category": "file_event",
  "product": "windows"
}

Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1

Source SHA-256: c4a6c889bb80ff909463e89ccc199827686a2d3c61e17230502d23e11d14fb45

Detection logic

Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.

title: Potential RipZip Attack on Startup Folder
id: a6976974-ea6f-4e97-818e-ea08625c52cb
status: test
description: |
    Detects a phishing attack which expands a ZIP file containing a malicious shortcut.
    If the victim expands the ZIP file via the explorer process, then the explorer process expands the malicious ZIP file and drops a malicious shortcut redirected to a backdoor into the Startup folder.
    Additionally, the file name of the malicious shortcut in Startup folder contains {0AFACED1-E828-11D1-9187-B532F1E9575D} meaning the folder shortcut operation.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/jonasLyk/status/1549338335243534336?t=CrmPocBGLbDyE4p6zTX1cg&s=19
author: Greg (rule)
date: 2022-07-21
modified: 2023-01-05
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1547
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection: # %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\target.lnk.{0AFACED1-E828-11D1-9187-B532F1E9575D}\target.lnk
        TargetFilename|contains|all:
            - '\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup'
            - '.lnk.{0AFACED1-E828-11D1-9187-B532F1E9575D}'
        Image|endswith: '\explorer.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Original YAML and metadata in JSON

False positives

  • Unknown

Source references

Connected ecosystem references

Exact source-tagged techniques

Telemetry review

Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.

Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.