1200KM / sigma-rule
Service DACL Abuse To Hide Services Via Sc.EXE — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule a537cfc3-4297-4789-92b5-345bfd845ad0. Service DACL Abuse To Hide Services Via Sc.EXE — Sigma Rule. Detects usage of the "sc.exe" utility adding a new service with special permission seen used by threat actors which makes the service hidden and unremovable.
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Andreas Hunkeler (@Karneades). Source status: test; severity: high. Source dates: 2021-12-20 / 2022-08-08.
{
"category": "process_creation",
"product": "windows"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: 748f440ffb11ec6e08ce795cd1135cd252444bbed24c682b6ffc956b1b8e5d09
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Service DACL Abuse To Hide Services Via Sc.EXE
id: a537cfc3-4297-4789-92b5-345bfd845ad0
related:
- id: 99cf1e02-00fb-4c0d-8375-563f978dfd37 # Deny Service Access
type: similar
- id: 98c5aeef-32d5-492f-b174-64a691896d25 # Generic SD tampering
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects usage of the "sc.exe" utility adding a new service with special permission seen used by threat actors which makes the service hidden and unremovable.
references:
- https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/10/threat-hunting-in-large-datasets-by.html
- https://www.sans.org/blog/red-team-tactics-hiding-windows-services/
- https://twitter.com/Alh4zr3d/status/1580925761996828672
- https://itconnect.uw.edu/tools-services-support/it-systems-infrastructure/msinf/other-help/understanding-sddl-syntax/
author: Andreas Hunkeler (@Karneades)
date: 2021-12-20
modified: 2022-08-08
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.execution
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1574.011
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\sc.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'sc.exe'
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'sdset'
# Summary of permissions
# DC: Delete All Child Objects
# LC: List Contents
# WP: Write All Properties
# DT: Delete Subtree
# SD: Delete
- 'DCLCWPDTSD'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
False positives
- Unknown
Source references
- https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/10/threat-hunting-in-large-datasets-by.html
- https://www.sans.org/blog/red-team-tactics-hiding-windows-services/
- https://twitter.com/Alh4zr3d/status/1580925761996828672
- https://itconnect.uw.edu/tools-services-support/it-systems-infrastructure/msinf/other-help/understanding-sddl-syntax/
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.