1200KM / sigma-rule
Suspicious Program Location Whitelisted In Firewall Via Netsh.EXE — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule a35f5a72-f347-4e36-8895-9869b0d5fc6d. Suspicious Program Location Whitelisted In Firewall Via Netsh.EXE — Sigma Rule. Detects Netsh command execution that whitelists a program located in a suspicious location in the Windows Firewall
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Sander Wiebing, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community. Source status: test; severity: high. Source dates: 2020-05-25 / 2023-12-11.
{
"category": "process_creation",
"product": "windows"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: fbafbe5395a6ed7144b4e0b1171fab1837c3bfe7d0dd042c07ac7f472549ea5e
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Suspicious Program Location Whitelisted In Firewall Via Netsh.EXE
id: a35f5a72-f347-4e36-8895-9869b0d5fc6d
status: test
description: Detects Netsh command execution that whitelists a program located in a suspicious location in the Windows Firewall
references:
- https://www.virusradar.com/en/Win32_Kasidet.AD/description
- https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/07e789f4f2f3259e7559fdccb36e96814c2dbff872a21e1fa03de9ee377d581f?environmentId=100
author: Sander Wiebing, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community
date: 2020-05-25
modified: 2023-12-11
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1686.003
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\netsh.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'netsh.exe'
selection_cli:
- CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'firewall'
- 'add'
- 'allowedprogram'
- CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'advfirewall'
- 'firewall'
- 'add'
- 'rule'
- 'action=allow'
- 'program='
selection_paths:
CommandLine|contains:
- ':\$Recycle.bin\'
- ':\RECYCLER.BIN\'
- ':\RECYCLERS.BIN\'
- ':\SystemVolumeInformation\'
- ':\Temp\'
- ':\Users\Default\'
- ':\Users\Desktop\'
- ':\Users\Public\'
- ':\Windows\addins\'
- ':\Windows\cursors\'
- ':\Windows\debug\'
- ':\Windows\drivers\'
- ':\Windows\fonts\'
- ':\Windows\help\'
- ':\Windows\system32\tasks\'
- ':\Windows\Tasks\'
- ':\Windows\Temp\'
- '\Downloads\'
- '\Local Settings\Temporary Internet Files\'
- '\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Outlook\'
- '%Public%\'
- '%TEMP%'
- '%TMP%'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
False positives
- Unknown
Source references
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.