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Wlrmdr.EXE Uncommon Argument Or Child Process — Sigma Rule

Sigma rule 9cfc00b6-bfb7-49ce-9781-ef78503154bb. Wlrmdr.EXE Uncommon Argument Or Child Process — Sigma Rule. Detects the execution of "Wlrmdr.exe" with the "-u" command line flag which allows anything passed to it to be an argument of the ShellExecute API, which would allow an attacker to execute arbitrary binaries. This detection also focuses on any uncommon child processes spawned from "Wlrmdr.exe" as a supplement for those that posses "ParentImage" telemetry.

Rule metadata and linked tags

Author: frack113, manasmbellani. Source status: experimental; severity: medium. Source dates: 2022-02-16 / 2025-10-31.

Original logsource
{
  "category": "process_creation",
  "product": "windows"
}

Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1

Source SHA-256: 2e98e7f72822d932896808794a6875d144639c396104ddcc4ee11ce2153980a2

Detection logic

Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.

Original Sigma rule YAML, scroll horizontally if needed
title: Wlrmdr.EXE Uncommon Argument Or Child Process
id: 9cfc00b6-bfb7-49ce-9781-ef78503154bb
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the execution of "Wlrmdr.exe" with the "-u" command line flag which allows anything passed to it to be an argument of the ShellExecute API, which would allow an attacker to execute arbitrary binaries.
    This detection also focuses on any uncommon child processes spawned from "Wlrmdr.exe" as a supplement for those that posses "ParentImage" telemetry.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1493963591745220608?s=20&t=xUg9DsZhJy1q9bPTUWgeIQ
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Wlrmdr/
author: frack113, manasmbellani
date: 2022-02-16
modified: 2025-10-31
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent: # This selection is looking for processes spawned from wlrmdr using the "-u" flag
        ParentImage|endswith: '\wlrmdr.exe'
    selection_child_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\wlrmdr.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'WLRMNDR.EXE'
    selection_child_cli_flags_s:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: '-s '
    selection_child_cli_flags_f:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: '-f '
    selection_child_cli_flags_t:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: '-t '
    selection_child_cli_flags_m:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: '-m '
    selection_child_cli_flags_a:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: '-a '
    selection_child_cli_flags_u:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: '-u '
    filter_main_winlogon:
        ParentImage: 'C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe'
    filter_main_empty:
        ParentImage:
            - ''
            - '-'
    filter_main_null:
        ParentImage: null
    condition: selection_parent or (all of selection_child_* and not 1 of filter_main_*)
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

Original YAML and metadata in JSON

False positives

  • Unknown

Source references

Connected ecosystem references

Exact source-tagged techniques

Telemetry review

Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.

Pinned research references. No browser attack runner or production-validated detector is asserted. Imported procedures remain unvalidated; any bounded lab evidence has its own scope. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.