1200KM / sigma-rule
Wlrmdr.EXE Uncommon Argument Or Child Process — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule 9cfc00b6-bfb7-49ce-9781-ef78503154bb. Wlrmdr.EXE Uncommon Argument Or Child Process — Sigma Rule. Detects the execution of "Wlrmdr.exe" with the "-u" command line flag which allows anything passed to it to be an argument of the ShellExecute API, which would allow an attacker to execute arbitrary binaries. This detection also focuses on any uncommon child processes spawned from "Wlrmdr.exe" as a supplement for those that posses "ParentImage" telemetry.
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: frack113, manasmbellani. Source status: experimental; severity: medium. Source dates: 2022-02-16 / 2025-10-31.
{
"category": "process_creation",
"product": "windows"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: 2e98e7f72822d932896808794a6875d144639c396104ddcc4ee11ce2153980a2
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Wlrmdr.EXE Uncommon Argument Or Child Process
id: 9cfc00b6-bfb7-49ce-9781-ef78503154bb
status: experimental
description: |
Detects the execution of "Wlrmdr.exe" with the "-u" command line flag which allows anything passed to it to be an argument of the ShellExecute API, which would allow an attacker to execute arbitrary binaries.
This detection also focuses on any uncommon child processes spawned from "Wlrmdr.exe" as a supplement for those that posses "ParentImage" telemetry.
references:
- https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1493963591745220608?s=20&t=xUg9DsZhJy1q9bPTUWgeIQ
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Wlrmdr/
author: frack113, manasmbellani
date: 2022-02-16
modified: 2025-10-31
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1218
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_parent: # This selection is looking for processes spawned from wlrmdr using the "-u" flag
ParentImage|endswith: '\wlrmdr.exe'
selection_child_img:
- Image|endswith: '\wlrmdr.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'WLRMNDR.EXE'
selection_child_cli_flags_s:
CommandLine|contains|windash: '-s '
selection_child_cli_flags_f:
CommandLine|contains|windash: '-f '
selection_child_cli_flags_t:
CommandLine|contains|windash: '-t '
selection_child_cli_flags_m:
CommandLine|contains|windash: '-m '
selection_child_cli_flags_a:
CommandLine|contains|windash: '-a '
selection_child_cli_flags_u:
CommandLine|contains|windash: '-u '
filter_main_winlogon:
ParentImage: 'C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe'
filter_main_empty:
ParentImage:
- ''
- '-'
filter_main_null:
ParentImage: null
condition: selection_parent or (all of selection_child_* and not 1 of filter_main_*)
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
False positives
- Unknown
Source references
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.