1200KM / sigma-rule
End User Consent — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule 9b2cc4c4-2ad4-416d-8e8e-ee6aa6f5035a. End User Consent — Sigma Rule. Detects when an end user consents to an application
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Bailey Bercik '@baileybercik', Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow'. Source status: test; severity: low. Source dates: 2022-07-28 / not supplied.
{
"product": "azure",
"service": "auditlogs"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: c09f9225d92cf53a3343d00b66ed96f0fba765ad81f434a35340a71e9158265c
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: End User Consent
id: 9b2cc4c4-2ad4-416d-8e8e-ee6aa6f5035a
status: test
description: Detects when an end user consents to an application
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-applications#end-user-consent
author: Bailey Bercik '@baileybercik', Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow'
date: 2022-07-28
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1528
logsource:
product: azure
service: auditlogs
detection:
selection:
ConsentContext.IsAdminConsent: 'false'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: low
False positives
- Unknown
Source references
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.