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AWS STS GetCallerIdentity Enumeration Via TruffleHog — Sigma Rule

Sigma rule 9b1b8e9b-0a5d-4af1-9d2f-4c4b6e7c2c9d. AWS STS GetCallerIdentity Enumeration Via TruffleHog — Sigma Rule. Detects the use of TruffleHog for AWS credential validation by identifying GetCallerIdentity API calls where the userAgent indicates TruffleHog. Threat actors leverage TruffleHog to enumerate and validate exposed AWS keys. Successful exploitation allows threat actors to confirm the validity of compromised AWS credentials, facilitating further unauthorized access and actions within the AWS environment.

Rule metadata and linked tags

Author: Adan Alvarez @adanalvarez. Source status: experimental; severity: medium. Source dates: 2025-10-12 / not supplied.

Original logsource
{
  "product": "aws",
  "service": "cloudtrail"
}

Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1

Source SHA-256: 0ac6ba13862ac8c17a345911cce8634ad643ee84d5bffdd40532c5ff7190fe97

Detection logic

Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.

Original Sigma rule YAML, scroll horizontally if needed
title: AWS STS GetCallerIdentity Enumeration Via TruffleHog
id: 9b1b8e9b-0a5d-4af1-9d2f-4c4b6e7c2c9d
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the use of TruffleHog for AWS credential validation by identifying GetCallerIdentity API calls where the userAgent indicates TruffleHog.
    Threat actors leverage TruffleHog to enumerate and validate exposed AWS keys.
    Successful exploitation allows threat actors to confirm the validity of compromised AWS credentials, facilitating further unauthorized access and actions within the AWS environment.
references:
    - https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/tr-crimson-collective-a-new-threat-group-observed-operating-in-the-cloud/
    - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/STS/latest/APIReference/API_GetCallerIdentity.html
    - https://github.com/trufflesecurity/trufflehog
author: Adan Alvarez @adanalvarez
date: 2025-10-12
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1087.004
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection:
        eventSource: 'sts.amazonaws.com'
        eventName: 'GetCallerIdentity'
        userAgent|contains: 'TruffleHog'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate internal security scanning or key validation that intentionally uses TruffleHog. Authorize and filter known scanner roles, IP ranges, or assumed roles as needed.
level: medium

Original YAML and metadata in JSON

False positives

  • Legitimate internal security scanning or key validation that intentionally uses TruffleHog. Authorize and filter known scanner roles, IP ranges, or assumed roles as needed.

Source references

Connected ecosystem references

Exact source-tagged techniques

Telemetry review

Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.

Pinned research references. No browser attack runner or production-validated detector is asserted. Imported procedures remain unvalidated; any bounded lab evidence has its own scope. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.