1200KM / sigma-rule
AWS STS GetCallerIdentity Enumeration Via TruffleHog — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule 9b1b8e9b-0a5d-4af1-9d2f-4c4b6e7c2c9d. AWS STS GetCallerIdentity Enumeration Via TruffleHog — Sigma Rule. Detects the use of TruffleHog for AWS credential validation by identifying GetCallerIdentity API calls where the userAgent indicates TruffleHog. Threat actors leverage TruffleHog to enumerate and validate exposed AWS keys. Successful exploitation allows threat actors to confirm the validity of compromised AWS credentials, facilitating further unauthorized access and actions within the AWS environment.
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Adan Alvarez @adanalvarez. Source status: experimental; severity: medium. Source dates: 2025-10-12 / not supplied.
{
"product": "aws",
"service": "cloudtrail"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: 0ac6ba13862ac8c17a345911cce8634ad643ee84d5bffdd40532c5ff7190fe97
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: AWS STS GetCallerIdentity Enumeration Via TruffleHog
id: 9b1b8e9b-0a5d-4af1-9d2f-4c4b6e7c2c9d
status: experimental
description: |
Detects the use of TruffleHog for AWS credential validation by identifying GetCallerIdentity API calls where the userAgent indicates TruffleHog.
Threat actors leverage TruffleHog to enumerate and validate exposed AWS keys.
Successful exploitation allows threat actors to confirm the validity of compromised AWS credentials, facilitating further unauthorized access and actions within the AWS environment.
references:
- https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/tr-crimson-collective-a-new-threat-group-observed-operating-in-the-cloud/
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/STS/latest/APIReference/API_GetCallerIdentity.html
- https://github.com/trufflesecurity/trufflehog
author: Adan Alvarez @adanalvarez
date: 2025-10-12
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1087.004
logsource:
product: aws
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection:
eventSource: 'sts.amazonaws.com'
eventName: 'GetCallerIdentity'
userAgent|contains: 'TruffleHog'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate internal security scanning or key validation that intentionally uses TruffleHog. Authorize and filter known scanner roles, IP ranges, or assumed roles as needed.
level: medium
False positives
- Legitimate internal security scanning or key validation that intentionally uses TruffleHog. Authorize and filter known scanner roles, IP ranges, or assumed roles as needed.
Source references
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.