1200KM / sigma-rule
Changing Existing Service ImagePath Value Via Reg.EXE — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule 9b0b7ac3-6223-47aa-a3fd-e8f211e637db. Changing Existing Service ImagePath Value Via Reg.EXE — Sigma Rule. Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the Registry entries used by services. Adversaries may use flaws in the permissions for registry to redirect from the originally specified executable to one that they control, in order to launch their own code at Service start. Windows stores local service configuration information in the Registry under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: frack113. Source status: test; severity: medium. Source dates: 2021-12-30 / 2024-03-13.
{
"category": "process_creation",
"product": "windows"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: 1b0e3604d6f0cb7023c5add49df0b581f8b500ac24256157d14ea0850db3a199
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Changing Existing Service ImagePath Value Via Reg.EXE
id: 9b0b7ac3-6223-47aa-a3fd-e8f211e637db
status: test
description: |
Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the Registry entries used by services.
Adversaries may use flaws in the permissions for registry to redirect from the originally specified executable to one that they control, in order to launch their own code at Service start.
Windows stores local service configuration information in the Registry under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1574.011/T1574.011.md#atomic-test-2---service-imagepath-change-with-regexe
author: frack113
date: 2021-12-30
modified: 2024-03-13
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.persistence
- attack.execution
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1574.011
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: '\reg.exe'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'add '
- 'SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\'
- ' ImagePath '
selection_value:
CommandLine|contains|windash: ' -d '
condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
False positives
- Unknown
Source references
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.