1200KM / sigma-rule
Potential Credential Dumping Via WER — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule 9a4ccd1a-3526-4d99-b980-9f9c5d3a6ff3. Potential Credential Dumping Via WER — Sigma Rule. Detects potential credential dumping via Windows Error Reporting LSASS Shtinkering technique which uses the Windows Error Reporting to dump lsass
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: @pbssubhash , Nasreddine Bencherchali. Source status: test; severity: high. Source dates: 2022-12-08 / 2022-12-09.
{
"product": "windows",
"category": "process_creation"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: 437f66f2de963fcdf7f500c287a3cc5e771c3b9c86f917f0b616ac3e904cab7d
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Potential Credential Dumping Via WER
id: 9a4ccd1a-3526-4d99-b980-9f9c5d3a6ff3
status: test
description: Detects potential credential dumping via Windows Error Reporting LSASS Shtinkering technique which uses the Windows Error Reporting to dump lsass
references:
- https://github.com/deepinstinct/Lsass-Shtinkering
- https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2030/DEF%20CON%2030%20presentations/Asaf%20Gilboa%20-%20LSASS%20Shtinkering%20Abusing%20Windows%20Error%20Reporting%20to%20Dump%20LSASS.pdf
author: '@pbssubhash , Nasreddine Bencherchali'
date: 2022-12-08
modified: 2022-12-09
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1003.001
logsource:
product: windows
category: process_creation
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\Werfault.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'WerFault.exe'
selection_cli:
ParentUser|contains: # covers many language settings
- 'AUTHORI'
- 'AUTORI'
User|contains:
- 'AUTHORI'
- 'AUTORI'
CommandLine|contains|all:
# Doc: WerFault.exe -u -p <target process> -ip <source process> -s <file mapping handle>
# Example: C:\Windows\system32\Werfault.exe -u -p 744 -ip 1112 -s 244
# If the source process is not equal to the target process and the target process is LSASS then this is an indication of this technique
# Example: If the "-p" points the PID of "lsass.exe" and "-ip" points to a different process than "lsass.exe" then this is a sign of malicious activity
- ' -u -p '
- ' -ip '
- ' -s '
filter_lsass:
ParentImage: 'C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe'
condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
- Windows Error Reporting might produce similar behavior. In that case, check the PID associated with the "-p" parameter in the CommandLine.
level: high
False positives
- Windows Error Reporting might produce similar behavior. In that case, check the PID associated with the "-p" parameter in the CommandLine.
Source references
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.