1200KM / sigma-rule
Deny Service Access Using Security Descriptor Tampering Via Sc.EXE — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule 99cf1e02-00fb-4c0d-8375-563f978dfd37. Deny Service Access Using Security Descriptor Tampering Via Sc.EXE — Sigma Rule. Detects suspicious DACL modifications to deny access to a service that affects critical trustees. This can be used to hide services or make them unstoppable.
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community. Source status: test; severity: high. Source dates: 2020-10-16 / 2023-02-28.
{
"category": "process_creation",
"product": "windows"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: d9693f7e9bccfbfc8ad45dd4d8d438346d2242d0c58ef1dcea0e873ad42e49fa
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Deny Service Access Using Security Descriptor Tampering Via Sc.EXE
id: 99cf1e02-00fb-4c0d-8375-563f978dfd37
related:
- id: 98c5aeef-32d5-492f-b174-64a691896d25 # Generic SD tampering
type: similar
- id: a537cfc3-4297-4789-92b5-345bfd845ad0 # Specific Technique
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects suspicious DACL modifications to deny access to a service that affects critical trustees. This can be used to hide services or make them unstoppable.
references:
- https://www.sans.org/blog/red-team-tactics-hiding-windows-services/
- https://itconnect.uw.edu/tools-services-support/it-systems-infrastructure/msinf/other-help/understanding-sddl-syntax/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthz/sid-strings
author: Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-16
modified: 2023-02-28
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1543.003
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_sc:
- Image|endswith: '\sc.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'sc.exe'
selection_sdset:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'sdset'
- 'D;' # Deny Access
selection_trustee:
CommandLine|contains:
- ';IU' # Interactively logged-on user
- ';SU' # Service logon user
- ';BA' # Built-in administrators
- ';SY' # Local system
- ';WD' # Everyone
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
False positives
- Unknown
Source references
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.