1200KM / sigma-rule
Potential File Extension Spoofing Using Right-to-Left Override — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule 979baf41-ca44-4540-9d0c-4fcef3b5a3a4. Potential File Extension Spoofing Using Right-to-Left Override — Sigma Rule. Detects suspicious filenames that contain a right-to-left override character and a potentially spoofed file extensions.
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Jonathan Peters (Nextron Systems), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems). Source status: test; severity: high. Source dates: 2024-11-17 / 2026-03-20.
{
"category": "file_event",
"product": "windows"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: 74fe34baa5f80911d1c2dc1386f9f9069edab92da702686720f455e5cde6e55b
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Potential File Extension Spoofing Using Right-to-Left Override
id: 979baf41-ca44-4540-9d0c-4fcef3b5a3a4
related:
- id: ad691d92-15f2-4181-9aa4-723c74f9ddc3
type: derived
status: test
description: |
Detects suspicious filenames that contain a right-to-left override character and a potentially spoofed file extensions.
references:
- https://redcanary.com/blog/right-to-left-override/
- https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2014/01/the-rtlo-method
- https://tria.ge/241015-l98snsyeje/behavioral2
- https://www.unicode.org/versions/Unicode5.2.0/ch02.pdf
author: Jonathan Peters (Nextron Systems), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2024-11-17
modified: 2026-03-20
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1036.002
logsource:
category: file_event
product: windows
detection:
selection_rtlo_unicode:
TargetFilename|contains:
- '\u202e' # Unicode RTLO character
- '[U+202E]'
# Real char U+202E copied/pasted below
- ''
selection_extensions:
TargetFilename|contains:
- '3pm.' # Reversed `.mp3`
- '4pm.' # Reversed `.mp4`
- 'cod.' # Reversed `.doc`
- 'fdp.' # Reversed `.pdf`
- 'ftr.' # Reversed `.rtf`
- 'gepj.' # Reversed `.jpeg`
- 'gnp.' # Reversed `.png`
- 'gpj.' # Reversed `.jpg`
- 'ism.' # Reversed `.msi`
- 'lmth.' # Reversed `.html`
- 'nls.' # Reversed `.sln`
- 'piz.' # Reversed `.zip`
- 'slx.' # Reversed `.xls`
- 'tdo.' # Reversed `.odt`
- 'vsc.' # Reversed `.csv`
- 'vwm.' # Reversed `.wmv`
- 'xcod.' # Reversed `.docx`
- 'xslx.' # Reversed `.xlsx`
- 'xtpp.' # Reversed `.pptx`
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Filenames that contains scriptures such as arabic or hebrew might make use of this character
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_right_to_left_override_extension_spoofing/info.yml
False positives
- Filenames that contains scriptures such as arabic or hebrew might make use of this character
Source references
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.