1200KM / sigma-rule
Suspicious ArcSOC.exe Child Process — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule 8e95e73e-ba02-4a87-b4d7-0929b8053038. Suspicious ArcSOC.exe Child Process — Sigma Rule. Detects script interpreters, command-line tools, and similar suspicious child processes of ArcSOC.exe. ArcSOC.exe is the process name which hosts ArcGIS Server REST services. If an attacker compromises an ArcGIS Server system and uploads a malicious Server Object Extension (SOE), they can send crafted requests to the corresponding service endpoint and remotely execute code from the ArcSOC.exe process.
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Micah Babinski. Source status: experimental; severity: high. Source dates: 2025-11-25 / not supplied.
{
"category": "process_creation",
"product": "windows"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: 0d69f0aad73732e5af619707a42d0013c6fb08cae11905b5c6bc4f315f04f5cb
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Suspicious ArcSOC.exe Child Process
id: 8e95e73e-ba02-4a87-b4d7-0929b8053038
status: experimental
description: |
Detects script interpreters, command-line tools, and similar suspicious child processes of ArcSOC.exe.
ArcSOC.exe is the process name which hosts ArcGIS Server REST services. If an attacker compromises an ArcGIS
Server system and uploads a malicious Server Object Extension (SOE), they can send crafted requests to the corresponding
service endpoint and remotely execute code from the ArcSOC.exe process.
references:
- https://reliaquest.com/blog/threat-spotlight-inside-flax-typhoons-arcgis-compromise/
- https://enterprise.arcgis.com/en/server/12.0/administer/windows/inside-an-arcgis-server-site.htm
author: Micah Babinski
date: 2025-11-25
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059
- attack.t1203
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
ParentImage|endswith: '\ArcSOC.exe'
Image|endswith:
- '\cmd.exe'
- '\cscript.exe'
- '\mshta.exe'
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- '\regsvr32.exe'
- '\rundll32.exe'
- '\wmic.exe'
- '\wscript.exe'
filter_main_cmd:
Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
CommandLine: 'cmd.exe /c "ver"'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
False positives
- Unknown
Source references
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.