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Potentially Suspicious CMD Shell Output Redirect — Sigma Rule

Sigma rule 8e0bb260-d4b2-4fff-bb8d-3f82118e6892. Potentially Suspicious CMD Shell Output Redirect — Sigma Rule. Detects inline Windows shell commands redirecting output via the ">" symbol to a suspicious location. This technique is sometimes used by malicious actors in order to redirect the output of reconnaissance commands such as "hostname" and "dir" to files for future exfiltration.

Rule metadata and linked tags

Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems). Source status: test; severity: medium. Source dates: 2022-07-12 / 2024-03-19.

Original logsource
{
  "category": "process_creation",
  "product": "windows"
}

Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1

Source SHA-256: 00d33cac2234b52d5515247550107b02cce63eb78d6551456bb77dae4bcaf76b

Detection logic

Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.

Original Sigma rule YAML, scroll horizontally if needed
title: Potentially Suspicious CMD Shell Output Redirect
id: 8e0bb260-d4b2-4fff-bb8d-3f82118e6892
related:
    - id: aa2efee7-34dd-446e-8a37-40790a66efd7
      type: derived
    - id: 4f4eaa9f-5ad4-410c-a4be-bc6132b0175a
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects inline Windows shell commands redirecting output via the ">" symbol to a suspicious location.
    This technique is sometimes used by malicious actors in order to redirect the output of reconnaissance commands such as "hostname" and "dir" to files for future exfiltration.
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/07/11/select-xmrig-from-sqlserver/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-12
modified: 2024-03-19
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'Cmd.Exe'
    selection_cli_1:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # Note: Add more suspicious locations as you find them
            # Note: The space from the start is missing to cover append operations ">>"
            # Note: We use the "?" to account for both a single and a double quote
            # Note: If you want to account for more spaces which is still a valid bypass option. Use a regex with "\s"
            - '>?%APPDATA%\'
            - '>?%TEMP%\'
            - '>?%TMP%\'
            - '>?%USERPROFILE%\'
            - '>?C:\ProgramData\'
            - '>?C:\Temp\'
            - '>?C:\Users\Public\'
            - '>?C:\Windows\Temp\'
    selection_cli_2:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' >'
            - '">'
            - "'>"
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'C:\Users\'
            - '\AppData\Local\'
    condition: selection_img and 1 of selection_cli_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate admin or third party scripts used for diagnostic collection might generate some false positives
level: medium

Original YAML and metadata in JSON

False positives

  • Legitimate admin or third party scripts used for diagnostic collection might generate some false positives

Source references

Connected ecosystem references

Exact source-tagged techniques

Telemetry review

Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.

Pinned research references. No browser attack runner or production-validated detector is asserted. Imported procedures remain unvalidated; any bounded lab evidence has its own scope. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.