1200KM / sigma-rule
Devcon Execution Disabling VMware VMCI Device — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule 85f520e7-6f5e-43ca-874c-222e5bf9c0de. Devcon Execution Disabling VMware VMCI Device — Sigma Rule. Detects execution of devcon.exe with commands that disable the VMware Virtual Machine Communication Interface (VMCI) device. This can be legitimate during VMware Tools troubleshooting or driver conflicts, but may also indicate malware attempting to hijack communication with the hardware via the VMCI device. This has been used to facilitate VMware ESXi vulnerability exploits to escape VMs and execute code on the ESXi host.
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Matt Anderson, Dray Agha, Anna Pham (Huntress). Source status: experimental; severity: high. Source dates: 2026-01-02 / not supplied.
{
"category": "process_creation",
"product": "windows"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: 4ff3a8af274fdd1b438d846d06a05c359f48c4c99bb159ec2b3acd5ae590b602
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Devcon Execution Disabling VMware VMCI Device
id: 85f520e7-6f5e-43ca-874c-222e5bf9c0de
status: experimental
description: |
Detects execution of devcon.exe with commands that disable the VMware Virtual Machine Communication Interface (VMCI) device.
This can be legitimate during VMware Tools troubleshooting or driver conflicts, but may also indicate malware attempting to hijack communication with the hardware via the VMCI device.
This has been used to facilitate VMware ESXi vulnerability exploits to escape VMs and execute code on the ESXi host.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/devtest/devcon
- https://communities.vmware.com/t5/VMware-Workstation-Pro/VMCI-driver-issues/td-p/2866060
- https://github.com/search?q=devcon+disable+VMWVMCIHOSTDEV
- https://huntress.com/blog/esxi-vm-escape-exploit
author: Matt Anderson, Dray Agha, Anna Pham (Huntress)
date: 2026-01-02
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1543.003
- attack.t1685
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\devcon.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'DevCon.exe'
selection_action:
CommandLine|contains: ' disable '
selection_vmci_pci:
CommandLine|contains:
- '15AD&DEV_0740' # VMware VMCI PCI device (Vendor 0x15AD = VMware, Device 0x0740 = VMCI)
- 'VMWVMCIHOSTDEV' # VMware VMCI root host device driver name
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate VMware administration, Tools installation/uninstallation, or troubleshooting driver conflicts.
- Automated scripts in virtualized environments for device cleanup.
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_devcon_disable_vmci_driver/info.yml
False positives
- Legitimate VMware administration, Tools installation/uninstallation, or troubleshooting driver conflicts.
- Automated scripts in virtualized environments for device cleanup.
Source references
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.