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VHD Image Download Via Browser — Sigma Rule

Sigma rule 8468111a-ef07-4654-903b-b863a80bbc95. VHD Image Download Via Browser — Sigma Rule. Detects creation of ".vhd"/".vhdx" files by browser processes. Malware can use mountable Virtual Hard Disk ".vhd" files to encapsulate payloads and evade security controls.

Rule metadata and linked tags

Author: frack113, Christopher Peacock '@securepeacock', SCYTHE '@scythe_io'. Source status: test; severity: medium. Source dates: 2021-10-25 / 2023-05-05.

{
  "category": "file_event",
  "product": "windows"
}

Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1

Source SHA-256: f5dc8618cfa67f285d44e9f02b1de45fd65d8769264d0c8471859e085d14c68c

Detection logic

Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.

title: VHD Image Download Via Browser
id: 8468111a-ef07-4654-903b-b863a80bbc95
status: test
description: |
    Detects creation of ".vhd"/".vhdx" files by browser processes.
    Malware can use mountable Virtual Hard Disk ".vhd" files to encapsulate payloads and evade security controls.
references:
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/intelligence-insights-october-2021/
    - https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/lazarus-vhd-ransomware/36559/
    - https://securelist.com/lazarus-on-the-hunt-for-big-game/97757/
author: frack113, Christopher Peacock '@securepeacock', SCYTHE '@scythe_io'
date: 2021-10-25
modified: 2023-05-05
tags:
    - attack.resource-development
    - attack.t1587.001
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\brave.exe'
            - '\chrome.exe'
            - '\firefox.exe'
            - '\iexplore.exe'
            - '\maxthon.exe'
            - '\MicrosoftEdge.exe'
            - '\msedge.exe'
            - '\msedgewebview2.exe'
            - '\opera.exe'
            - '\safari.exe'
            - '\seamonkey.exe'
            - '\vivaldi.exe'
            - '\whale.exe'
        # We don't use "endswith" to also match with ADS logs and ".vhdx". Example: "TargetFilename: C:\Users\xxx\Downloads\windows.vhd:Zone.Identifier"
        TargetFilename|contains: '.vhd'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate downloads of ".vhd" files would also trigger this
level: medium

Original YAML and metadata in JSON

False positives

  • Legitimate downloads of ".vhd" files would also trigger this

Source references

Connected ecosystem references

Exact source-tagged techniques

Telemetry review

Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.

Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.