1200KM / sigma-rule
PUA - Process Hacker Execution — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule 811e0002-b13b-4a15-9d00-a613fce66e42. PUA - Process Hacker Execution — Sigma Rule. Detects the execution of Process Hacker based on binary metadata information (Image, Hash, Imphash, etc). Process Hacker is a tool to view and manipulate processes, kernel options and other low level options. Threat actors abused older vulnerable versions to manipulate system processes.
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems). Source status: test; severity: medium. Source dates: 2022-10-10 / 2024-11-23.
{
"category": "process_creation",
"product": "windows"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: 72800819b01116eaee1ec3394005e249145bc3d97515411be6ff165a3a42187f
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: PUA - Process Hacker Execution
id: 811e0002-b13b-4a15-9d00-a613fce66e42
related:
- id: 5722dff1-4bdd-4949-86ab-fbaf707e767a
type: similar
status: test
description: |
Detects the execution of Process Hacker based on binary metadata information (Image, Hash, Imphash, etc).
Process Hacker is a tool to view and manipulate processes, kernel options and other low level options.
Threat actors abused older vulnerable versions to manipulate system processes.
references:
- https://processhacker.sourceforge.io/
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/falcon-overwatch-report-finds-increase-in-ecrime/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-10-10
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1622
- attack.t1564
- attack.t1543
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
- Image|contains: '\ProcessHacker_'
- Image|endswith: '\ProcessHacker.exe'
- OriginalFileName:
- 'ProcessHacker.exe'
- 'Process Hacker'
- Description: 'Process Hacker'
- Product: 'Process Hacker'
- Hashes|contains:
- 'MD5=68F9B52895F4D34E74112F3129B3B00D'
- 'MD5=B365AF317AE730A67C936F21432B9C71'
- 'SHA1=A0BDFAC3CE1880B32FF9B696458327CE352E3B1D'
- 'SHA1=C5E2018BF7C0F314FED4FD7FE7E69FA2E648359E'
- 'SHA256=D4A0FE56316A2C45B9BA9AC1005363309A3EDC7ACF9E4DF64D326A0FF273E80F'
- 'SHA256=BD2C2CF0631D881ED382817AFCCE2B093F4E412FFB170A719E2762F250ABFEA4'
- 'IMPHASH=3695333C60DEDECDCAFF1590409AA462'
- 'IMPHASH=04DE0AD9C37EB7BD52043D2ECAC958DF'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- While sometimes 'Process Hacker is used by legitimate administrators, the execution of Process Hacker must be investigated and allowed on a case by case basis
level: medium
False positives
- While sometimes 'Process Hacker is used by legitimate administrators, the execution of Process Hacker must be investigated and allowed on a case by case basis
Source references
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.