1200KM / sigma-rule
Remote Access Tool - ScreenConnect Potential Suspicious Remote Command Execution — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule 7b582f1a-b318-4c6a-bf4e-66fe49bf55a5. Remote Access Tool - ScreenConnect Potential Suspicious Remote Command Execution — Sigma Rule. Detects potentially suspicious child processes launched via the ScreenConnect client service.
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), @Kostastsale. Source status: test; severity: medium. Source dates: 2022-02-25 / 2024-02-28.
{
"product": "windows",
"category": "process_creation"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: f899c2d70066d2b05dec7ca628b6fec544c0a1393fefab9ab5a996802b8b7d24
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Remote Access Tool - ScreenConnect Potential Suspicious Remote Command Execution
id: 7b582f1a-b318-4c6a-bf4e-66fe49bf55a5
related:
- id: d1a401ab-8c47-4e86-a7d8-2460b6a53e4a
type: derived
status: test
description: |
Detects potentially suspicious child processes launched via the ScreenConnect client service.
references:
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/telegram-malware-iranian-espionage
- https://docs.connectwise.com/ConnectWise_Control_Documentation/Get_started/Host_client/View_menu/Backstage_mode
- https://www.huntress.com/blog/slashandgrab-screen-connect-post-exploitation-in-the-wild-cve-2024-1709-cve-2024-1708
- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/24/b/threat-actor-groups-including-black-basta-are-exploiting-recent-.html
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), @Kostastsale
date: 2022-02-25
modified: 2024-02-28
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1219.002
logsource:
product: windows
category: process_creation
detection:
selection:
ParentCommandLine|contains|all:
- ':\Windows\TEMP\ScreenConnect\'
- 'run.cmd'
Image|endswith:
- '\bitsadmin.exe'
- '\cmd.exe'
- '\curl.exe'
- '\dllhost.exe'
- '\net.exe'
- '\nltest.exe'
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- '\rundll32.exe'
- '\wevtutil.exe'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- If the script being executed make use of any of the utilities mentioned in the detection then they should filtered out or allowed.
level: medium
False positives
- If the script being executed make use of any of the utilities mentioned in the detection then they should filtered out or allowed.
Source references
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/telegram-malware-iranian-espionage
- https://docs.connectwise.com/ConnectWise_Control_Documentation/Get_started/Host_client/View_menu/Backstage_mode
- https://www.huntress.com/blog/slashandgrab-screen-connect-post-exploitation-in-the-wild-cve-2024-1709-cve-2024-1708
- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/24/b/threat-actor-groups-including-black-basta-are-exploiting-recent-.html
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.