1200KM / sigma-rule
Potential JLI.dll Side-Loading — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule 7a3b6d1f-4a2b-4f8c-9d7e-e9f8cbf21a35. Potential JLI.dll Side-Loading — Sigma Rule. Detects potential DLL side-loading of jli.dll. JLI.dll has been observed being side-loaded by Java processes by various threat actors, including APT41, XWorm, and others in order to load malicious payloads in context of legitimate Java processes.
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems). Source status: experimental; severity: high. Source dates: 2025-07-25 / 2025-10-06.
{
"category": "image_load",
"product": "windows"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: 4f9ebddc3598c23e2e50ddfb12a6564b8bc8e2a03af4e0b53bd7c18a23f0acf6
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Potential JLI.dll Side-Loading
id: 7a3b6d1f-4a2b-4f8c-9d7e-e9f8cbf21a35
status: experimental
description: |
Detects potential DLL side-loading of jli.dll.
JLI.dll has been observed being side-loaded by Java processes by various threat actors, including APT41, XWorm,
and others in order to load malicious payloads in context of legitimate Java processes.
references:
- https://securelist.com/apt41-in-africa/116986/
- https://lab52.io/blog/snake-keylogger-in-geopolitical-affairs-abuse-of-trusted-java-utilities-in-cybercrime-operations/
- https://hijacklibs.net/entries/3rd_party/oracle/jli.html
- https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/phish-china-aligned-espionage-actors-ramp-up-taiwan-semiconductor-targeting
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-07-25
modified: 2025-10-06
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.execution
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1574.001
logsource:
category: image_load
product: windows
detection:
selection:
ImageLoaded|endswith: '\jli.dll'
filter_main_legitimate_install_paths:
ImageLoaded|startswith:
# Keeping the paths generic as jli.dll was found inside various directories of installed software
- 'C:\Program Files\'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\'
Description: 'OpenJDK Platform binary'
OriginalFileName: 'jli.dll'
Product|startswith: 'OpenJDK Platform'
Signed: 'true'
filter_optional_eclipse:
ImageLoaded|startswith: 'C:\eclipse\plugins\'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
False positives
- Unknown
Source references
- https://securelist.com/apt41-in-africa/116986/
- https://lab52.io/blog/snake-keylogger-in-geopolitical-affairs-abuse-of-trusted-java-utilities-in-cybercrime-operations/
- https://hijacklibs.net/entries/3rd_party/oracle/jli.html
- https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/phish-china-aligned-espionage-actors-ramp-up-taiwan-semiconductor-targeting
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.