1200KM / sigma-rule
AWS S3 Data Management Tampering — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule 78b3756a-7804-4ef7-8555-7b9024a02e2d. AWS S3 Data Management Tampering — Sigma Rule. Detects when a user tampers with S3 data management in Amazon Web Services.
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Austin Songer @austinsonger. Source status: test; severity: low. Source dates: 2021-07-24 / 2022-10-09.
{
"product": "aws",
"service": "cloudtrail"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: 880d32e8ed7a24bb7af50d6b3fd6a6a0440dc92066a1380dac5c3337f8450389
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: AWS S3 Data Management Tampering
id: 78b3756a-7804-4ef7-8555-7b9024a02e2d
status: test
description: Detects when a user tampers with S3 data management in Amazon Web Services.
references:
- https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/pull/1145/files
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_Operations.html
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_PutBucketLogging.html
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_PutBucketWebsite.html
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_PutBucketEncryption.html
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/userguide/setting-repl-config-perm-overview.html
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_RestoreObject.html
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
date: 2021-07-24
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
- attack.exfiltration
- attack.t1537
logsource:
product: aws
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection:
eventSource: s3.amazonaws.com
eventName:
- PutBucketLogging
- PutBucketWebsite
- PutEncryptionConfiguration
- PutLifecycleConfiguration
- PutReplicationConfiguration
- ReplicateObject
- RestoreObject
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- A S3 configuration change may be done by a system or network administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment. S3 configuration change from unfamiliar users or hosts should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule.
level: low
False positives
- A S3 configuration change may be done by a system or network administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment. S3 configuration change from unfamiliar users or hosts should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule.
Source references
- https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/pull/1145/files
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_Operations.html
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_PutBucketLogging.html
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_PutBucketWebsite.html
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_PutBucketEncryption.html
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/userguide/setting-repl-config-perm-overview.html
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_RestoreObject.html
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.