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Potential NTLM Coercion Via Certutil.EXE — Sigma Rule

Sigma rule 6c6d9280-e6d0-4b9d-80ac-254701b64916. Potential NTLM Coercion Via Certutil.EXE — Sigma Rule. Detects possible NTLM coercion via certutil using the 'syncwithWU' flag

Rule metadata and linked tags

Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems). Source status: test; severity: high. Source dates: 2022-09-01 / 2023-02-14.

{
  "category": "process_creation",
  "product": "windows"
}

Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1

Source SHA-256: 13fd1af3471ae068c1be0041a9903541f262c1ffdacc9a6b244ba11f05e77975

Detection logic

Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.

title: Potential NTLM Coercion Via Certutil.EXE
id: 6c6d9280-e6d0-4b9d-80ac-254701b64916
status: test
description: Detects possible NTLM coercion via certutil using the 'syncwithWU' flag
references:
    - https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/issues/243
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-01
modified: 2023-02-14
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\certutil.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'CertUtil.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' -syncwithWU '
            - ' \\\\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_certutil_ntlm_coercion/info.yml

Original YAML and metadata in JSON

False positives

  • Unknown

Source references

Connected ecosystem references

Exact source-tagged techniques

Telemetry review

Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.

Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.