1200KM / sigma-rule
New Cron File Created — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule 6c4e2f43-d94d-4ead-b64d-97e53fa2bd05. New Cron File Created — Sigma Rule. Detects the creation of cron files in Cron directories, which could indicate potential persistence mechanisms being established by an attacker. Note that not all cron file creations are malicious - legitimate system administration activities and software installations may also create cron files. This detection should be investigated in context, considering factors such as the user creating the file, the timing of creation, and the contents of the cron job. Focus investigation on unexpected cron files created by non-administrative users or during suspicious timeframes. Additionally, it is recommended to review the contents of the newly created cron files to assess their intent. Furthermore, it is suggested to baseline normal cron file creation and apply additional filters to reduce false positives based on the specific environment.
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research), MSTIC. Source status: experimental; severity: low. Source dates: 2021-10-15 / 2026-04-28.
{
"product": "linux",
"category": "file_event"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: 4eaf424d886d933be880e31432b1dae378ee222b602ed07aa26fd148c6406c35
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: New Cron File Created
id: 6c4e2f43-d94d-4ead-b64d-97e53fa2bd05
status: experimental
description: |
Detects the creation of cron files in Cron directories, which could indicate potential persistence mechanisms being established by an attacker.
Note that not all cron file creations are malicious - legitimate system administration activities and software installations may also create cron files.
This detection should be investigated in context, considering factors such as the user creating the file, the timing of creation, and the contents of the cron job.
Focus investigation on unexpected cron files created by non-administrative users or during suspicious timeframes.
Additionally, it is recommended to review the contents of the newly created cron files to assess their intent.
Furthermore, it is suggested to baseline normal cron file creation and apply additional filters to reduce false positives based on the specific environment.
references:
- https://github.com/microsoft/MSTIC-Sysmon/blob/f1477c0512b0747c1455283069c21faec758e29d/linux/configs/attack-based/persistence/T1053.003_Cron_Activity.xml
- https://pberba.github.io/security/2022/01/30/linux-threat-hunting-for-persistence-systemd-timers-cron/
- https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/primer-on-persistence-mechanisms
- https://snehbavarva.medium.com/privilege-escalation-techniques-series-linux-cron-jobs-a5b797b424b4
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research), MSTIC
date: 2021-10-15
modified: 2026-04-28
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.execution
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1053.003
logsource:
product: linux
category: file_event
detection:
selection_cron_dirs:
TargetFilename|startswith:
- '/etc/cron.d/'
- '/etc/cron.daily/'
- '/etc/cron.hourly/'
- '/etc/cron.monthly/'
- '/etc/cron.weekly/'
- '/var/spool/cron/crontabs/'
- '/var/spool/cron/root'
selection_cron_special_files:
TargetFilename|contains:
- '/etc/cron.allow'
- '/etc/cron.deny'
- '/etc/crontab'
filter_optional_legit_cron:
# Note: FPs on docker images: golang, postgres, python, redis, ruby
TargetFilename:
- '/etc/cron.daily/apt'
- '/etc/cron.daily/dpkg'
- '/etc/cron.daily/passwd'
- '/etc/crontabs/root'
condition: 1 of selection_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administrative tasks, package managers, containers, configuration management tools, cloud agents, or system maintenance operations might cause false positives. Apply baselining before deployment.
level: low
False positives
- Legitimate administrative tasks, package managers, containers, configuration management tools, cloud agents, or system maintenance operations might cause false positives. Apply baselining before deployment.
Source references
- https://github.com/microsoft/MSTIC-Sysmon/blob/f1477c0512b0747c1455283069c21faec758e29d/linux/configs/attack-based/persistence/T1053.003_Cron_Activity.xml
- https://pberba.github.io/security/2022/01/30/linux-threat-hunting-for-persistence-systemd-timers-cron/
- https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/primer-on-persistence-mechanisms
- https://snehbavarva.medium.com/privilege-escalation-techniques-series-linux-cron-jobs-a5b797b424b4
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.