1200kmSECURITY RESEARCH

1200KM / sigma-rule

Odbcconf.EXE Suspicious DLL Location — Sigma Rule

Sigma rule 6b65c28e-11f3-46cb-902a-68f2cafaf474. Odbcconf.EXE Suspicious DLL Location — Sigma Rule. Detects execution of "odbcconf" where the path of the DLL being registered is located in a potentially suspicious location.

Rule metadata and linked tags

Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems). Source status: test; severity: high. Source dates: 2023-05-22 / 2023-05-26.

{
  "category": "process_creation",
  "product": "windows"
}

Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1

Source SHA-256: 16d41440cd7294abf2da0565914bb4a0c0e66c7b7c69b5f6916de5fa380087e9

Detection logic

Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.

title: Odbcconf.EXE Suspicious DLL Location
id: 6b65c28e-11f3-46cb-902a-68f2cafaf474
status: test
description: Detects execution of "odbcconf" where the path of the DLL being registered is located in a potentially suspicious location.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/odbc/odbcconf-exe?view=sql-server-ver16
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/17/h/backdoor-carrying-emails-set-sights-on-russian-speaking-businesses.html
    - https://securityintelligence.com/posts/raspberry-robin-worm-dridex-malware/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-22
modified: 2023-05-26
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218.008
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\odbcconf.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'odbcconf.exe'
    selection_cli:
        # Note: Add more suspicious locations
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ':\PerfLogs\'
            - ':\ProgramData\'
            - ':\Temp\'
            - ':\Users\Public\'
            - ':\Windows\Registration\CRMLog'
            - ':\Windows\System32\com\dmp\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\FxsTmp\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\Microsoft\Crypto\RSA\MachineKeys\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\spool\PRINTERS\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\spool\SERVERS\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\Tasks_Migrated\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\SyncCenter\'
            - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\com\dmp\'
            - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\FxsTmp\'
            - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\PLA\System\'
            - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\SyncCenter\'
            - ':\Windows\Tasks\'
            - ':\Windows\Temp\'
            - ':\Windows\Tracing\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - '\AppData\Roaming\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

Original YAML and metadata in JSON

False positives

  • Unlikely

Source references

Connected ecosystem references

Exact source-tagged techniques

Telemetry review

Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.

Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.