1200KM / sigma-rule
Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Clip - System — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule 63e3365d-4824-42d8-8b82-e56810fefa0c. Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Clip - System — Sigma Rule. Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Clip.exe in Scripts
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community. Source status: test; severity: high. Source dates: 2020-10-09 / 2022-11-29.
{
"product": "windows",
"service": "system"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: ac978f3c821af9b1ac12b0f455dc6941537af2195ec79e396ea2f52f0d94bb8d
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Clip - System
id: 63e3365d-4824-42d8-8b82-e56810fefa0c
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Clip.exe in Scripts
references:
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task29)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-09
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: system
detection:
selection:
Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
EventID: 7045
ImagePath|contains: '(Clipboard|i'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
False positives
- Unknown
Source references
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.