1200KM / sigma-rule
Alternate PowerShell Hosts Pipe — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule 58cb02d5-78ce-4692-b3e1-dce850aae41a. Alternate PowerShell Hosts Pipe — Sigma Rule. Detects alternate PowerShell hosts potentially bypassing detections looking for powershell.exe
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g, Tim Shelton. Source status: test; severity: medium. Source dates: 2019-09-12 / 2025-10-07.
{
"product": "windows",
"category": "pipe_created",
"definition": "Note that you have to configure logging for Named Pipe Events in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18). The basic configuration is in popular sysmon configuration (https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config), but it is worth verifying. You can also use other repo, e.g. https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config, https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular. How to test detection? You can check powershell script from this site https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: 0a76adb129502772fd4d80866fe52b750d44b3b57f7296be0cf0570cf5a81329
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Alternate PowerShell Hosts Pipe
id: 58cb02d5-78ce-4692-b3e1-dce850aae41a
related:
- id: ac7102b4-9e1e-4802-9b4f-17c5524c015c
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects alternate PowerShell hosts potentially bypassing detections looking for powershell.exe
references:
- https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/190610-PwshAlternateHosts/notebook.html
- https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/190410-LocalPwshExecution/notebook.html
author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g, Tim Shelton
date: 2019-09-12
modified: 2025-10-07
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
product: windows
category: pipe_created
definition: 'Note that you have to configure logging for Named Pipe Events in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18). The basic configuration is in popular sysmon configuration (https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config), but it is worth verifying. You can also use other repo, e.g. https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config, https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular. How to test detection? You can check powershell script from this site https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575'
detection:
selection:
PipeName|startswith: '\PSHost'
filter_main_generic:
- Image|contains:
- ':\Program Files\PowerShell\7-preview\pwsh.exe' # Powershell 7
- ':\Program Files\PowerShell\7\pwsh.exe' # Powershell 7
- ':\Windows\system32\dsac.exe'
- ':\Windows\system32\inetsrv\w3wp.exe' # this is sad :,( but it triggers FPs on Exchange servers
- ':\Windows\System32\sdiagnhost.exe'
- ':\Windows\system32\ServerManager.exe'
- ':\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe'
- ':\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell_ise.exe'
- ':\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe'
- ':\Windows\System32\wsmprovhost.exe'
- ':\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell_ise.exe'
- ':\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe'
- Image|contains|all:
- 'C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\Microsoft.PowerShellPreview'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- Image|contains|all:
- '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\WindowsApps\Microsoft.PowerShellPreview'
- '\pwsh.exe'
filter_optional_sqlserver: # Microsoft SQL Server\130\Tools\
Image|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\'
- 'C:\Program Files\'
Image|contains: '\Microsoft SQL Server\'
Image|endswith: '\Tools\Binn\SQLPS.exe'
filter_optional_azure_connected_machine_agent:
# Azure Connected Machine Agent (https://devblogs.microsoft.com/powershell/azure-policy-guest-configuration-client/)
Image|startswith: 'C:\Program Files\AzureConnectedMachineAgent\GCArcService'
Image|endswith: '\GC\gc_worker.exe'
filter_optional_citrix:
Image|startswith: 'C:\Program Files\Citrix\'
filter_optional_exchange:
Image|startswith: 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft\Exchange Server\'
filter_main_null:
Image: null
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
- Programs using PowerShell directly without invocation of a dedicated interpreter.
level: medium
False positives
- Programs using PowerShell directly without invocation of a dedicated interpreter.
Source references
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.