1200KM / sigma-rule
Suspicious SignIns From A Non Registered Device — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule 572b12d4-9062-11ed-a1eb-0242ac120002. Suspicious SignIns From A Non Registered Device — Sigma Rule. Detects risky authentication from a non AD registered device without MFA being required.
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Harjot Singh, '@cyb3rjy0t'. Source status: test; severity: high. Source dates: 2023-01-10 / 2025-07-02.
{
"product": "azure",
"service": "signinlogs"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: 05e9e37af72bfea775c76056d4ab47b1ec9386c1b5fe57233cdd3647f9585d55
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Suspicious SignIns From A Non Registered Device
id: 572b12d4-9062-11ed-a1eb-0242ac120002
status: test
description: Detects risky authentication from a non AD registered device without MFA being required.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-devices#non-compliant-device-sign-in
author: Harjot Singh, '@cyb3rjy0t'
date: 2023-01-10
modified: 2025-07-02
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.persistence
- attack.initial-access
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1078
logsource:
product: azure
service: signinlogs
detection:
selection_main:
Status: 'Success'
AuthenticationRequirement: 'singleFactorAuthentication'
RiskState: 'atRisk'
selection_empty1:
DeviceDetail.trusttype: ''
selection_empty2:
DeviceDetail.trusttype: null
condition: selection_main and 1 of selection_empty*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
False positives
- Unknown
Source references
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.