1200KM / sigma-rule
Potential Azure Browser SSO Abuse — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule 50f852e6-af22-4c78-9ede-42ef36aa3453. Potential Azure Browser SSO Abuse — Sigma Rule. Detects abusing Azure Browser SSO by requesting OAuth 2.0 refresh tokens for an Azure-AD-authenticated Windows user (i.e. the machine is joined to Azure AD and a user logs in with their Azure AD account) wanting to perform SSO authentication in the browser. An attacker can use this to authenticate to Azure AD in a browser as that user.
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Den Iuzvyk. Source status: test; severity: low. Source dates: 2020-07-15 / 2023-04-18.
{
"category": "image_load",
"product": "windows"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: 8a6c33b31b57d35958e06a11634e4be1f1695e85e2019d98116a5c21cd27e550
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Potential Azure Browser SSO Abuse
id: 50f852e6-af22-4c78-9ede-42ef36aa3453
status: test
description: |
Detects abusing Azure Browser SSO by requesting OAuth 2.0 refresh tokens for an Azure-AD-authenticated Windows user (i.e. the machine is joined to Azure AD and a user logs in with their Azure AD account) wanting to perform SSO authentication in the browser.
An attacker can use this to authenticate to Azure AD in a browser as that user.
references:
- https://posts.specterops.io/requesting-azure-ad-request-tokens-on-azure-ad-joined-machines-for-browser-sso-2b0409caad30
author: Den Iuzvyk
date: 2020-07-15
modified: 2023-04-18
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.execution
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1574.001
logsource:
category: image_load
product: windows
detection:
selection:
ImageLoaded: 'C:\Windows\System32\MicrosoftAccountTokenProvider.dll'
filter_main_bgtaskhost:
Image|startswith:
- 'C:\Windows\System32\'
- 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\'
Image|endswith: '\BackgroundTaskHost.exe'
# CommandLine|contains: '-ServerNameBackgroundTaskHost.WebAccountProvider'
filter_optional_devenv:
Image|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft Visual Studio\'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Visual Studio\'
Image|endswith: '\IDE\devenv.exe'
filter_optional_ie:
Image:
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe'
- 'C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe'
filter_optional_edge_1:
- Image|startswith: 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeWebView\Application\'
- Image|endswith: '\WindowsApps\MicrosoftEdge.exe'
- Image:
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe'
- 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe'
filter_optional_edge_2:
Image|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeCore\'
- 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft\EdgeCore\'
Image|endswith:
- '\msedge.exe'
- '\msedgewebview2.exe'
filter_optional_onedrive:
Image|endswith: '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\OneDrive\OneDrive.exe'
filter_optional_null:
Image: null
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
- False positives are expected since this rules is only looking for the DLL load event. This rule is better used in correlation with related activity
level: low
False positives
- False positives are expected since this rules is only looking for the DLL load event. This rule is better used in correlation with related activity
Source references
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.