1200KM / sigma-rule
Potential PendingFileRenameOperations Tampering — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule 4eec988f-7bf0-49f1-8675-1e6a510b3a2a. Potential PendingFileRenameOperations Tampering — Sigma Rule. Detect changes to the "PendingFileRenameOperations" registry key from uncommon or suspicious images locations to stage currently used files for rename or deletion after reboot.
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: frack113. Source status: test; severity: medium. Source dates: 2023-01-27 / 2025-10-07.
{
"category": "registry_set",
"product": "windows"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: 241890c42aadf4f6f8c94289744743c9f2952a93539626c394ced0571a63f491
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Potential PendingFileRenameOperations Tampering
id: 4eec988f-7bf0-49f1-8675-1e6a510b3a2a
status: test
description: |
Detect changes to the "PendingFileRenameOperations" registry key from uncommon or suspicious images locations to stage currently used files for rename or deletion after reboot.
references:
- https://any.run/report/3ecd4763ffc944fdc67a9027e459cd4f448b1a8d1b36147977afaf86bbf2a261/64b0ba45-e7ce-423b-9a1d-5b4ea59521e6
- https://devblogs.microsoft.com/scripting/determine-pending-reboot-statuspowershell-style-part-1/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-2000-server/cc960241(v=technet.10)?redirectedfrom=MSDN
- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/21/j/purplefox-adds-new-backdoor-that-uses-websockets.html
- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/19/i/purple-fox-fileless-malware-with-rookit-component-delivered-by-rig-exploit-kit-now-abuses-powershell.html
author: frack113
date: 2023-01-27
modified: 2025-10-07
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1036.003
logsource:
category: registry_set
product: windows
detection:
selection_main:
TargetObject|contains: '\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\PendingFileRenameOperations'
selection_susp_paths:
Image|contains: '\Users\Public\'
# - '\AppData\Local\Temp\' # Commented out as it's used by legitimate installers
selection_susp_images:
Image|endswith:
- '\reg.exe'
- '\regedit.exe'
condition: selection_main and 1 of selection_susp_*
falsepositives:
- Installers and updaters may set currently in use files for rename or deletion after a reboot.
level: medium
False positives
- Installers and updaters may set currently in use files for rename or deletion after a reboot.
Source references
- https://any.run/report/3ecd4763ffc944fdc67a9027e459cd4f448b1a8d1b36147977afaf86bbf2a261/64b0ba45-e7ce-423b-9a1d-5b4ea59521e6
- https://devblogs.microsoft.com/scripting/determine-pending-reboot-statuspowershell-style-part-1/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-2000-server/cc960241(v=technet.10)?redirectedfrom=MSDN
- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/21/j/purplefox-adds-new-backdoor-that-uses-websockets.html
- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/19/i/purple-fox-fileless-malware-with-rookit-component-delivered-by-rig-exploit-kit-now-abuses-powershell.html
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.