1200KM / sigma-rule
HackTool - Impacket Tools Execution — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule 4627c6ae-6899-46e2-aa0c-6ebcb1becd19. HackTool - Impacket Tools Execution — Sigma Rule. Detects the execution of different compiled Windows binaries of the impacket toolset (based on names or part of their names - could lead to false positives)
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems). Source status: test; severity: high. Source dates: 2021-07-24 / 2023-02-07.
{
"category": "process_creation",
"product": "windows"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: 516eebfdfbe1a707df54b5f32b9bbbddf5a8411fa38281050578b7277c2e4468
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: HackTool - Impacket Tools Execution
id: 4627c6ae-6899-46e2-aa0c-6ebcb1becd19
status: test
description: Detects the execution of different compiled Windows binaries of the impacket toolset (based on names or part of their names - could lead to false positives)
references:
- https://github.com/ropnop/impacket_static_binaries/releases/tag/0.9.21-dev-binaries
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-07-24
modified: 2023-02-07
tags:
- attack.collection
- attack.execution
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1557.001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
- Image|contains:
- '\goldenPac'
- '\karmaSMB'
- '\kintercept'
- '\ntlmrelayx'
- '\rpcdump'
- '\samrdump'
- '\secretsdump'
- '\smbexec'
- '\smbrelayx'
- '\wmiexec'
- '\wmipersist'
- Image|endswith:
- '\atexec_windows.exe'
- '\dcomexec_windows.exe'
- '\dpapi_windows.exe'
- '\findDelegation_windows.exe'
- '\GetADUsers_windows.exe'
- '\GetNPUsers_windows.exe'
- '\getPac_windows.exe'
- '\getST_windows.exe'
- '\getTGT_windows.exe'
- '\GetUserSPNs_windows.exe'
- '\ifmap_windows.exe'
- '\mimikatz_windows.exe'
- '\netview_windows.exe'
- '\nmapAnswerMachine_windows.exe'
- '\opdump_windows.exe'
- '\psexec_windows.exe'
- '\rdp_check_windows.exe'
- '\sambaPipe_windows.exe'
- '\smbclient_windows.exe'
- '\smbserver_windows.exe'
- '\sniff_windows.exe'
- '\sniffer_windows.exe'
- '\split_windows.exe'
- '\ticketer_windows.exe'
# - '\addcomputer_windows.exe'
# - '\esentutl_windows.exe'
# - '\getArch_windows.exe'
# - '\lookupsid_windows.exe'
# - '\mqtt_check_windows.exe'
# - '\mssqlclient_windows.exe'
# - '\mssqlinstance_windows.exe'
# - '\ntfs-read_windows.exe'
# - '\ping_windows.exe'
# - '\ping6_windows.exe'
# - '\raiseChild_windows.exe'
# - '\reg_windows.exe'
# - '\registry-read_windows.exe'
# - '\services_windows.exe'
# - '\wmiquery_windows.exe'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate use of the impacket tools
level: high
False positives
- Legitimate use of the impacket tools
Source references
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.