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Driver/DLL Installation Via Odbcconf.EXE — Sigma Rule

Sigma rule 3f5491e2-8db8-496b-9e95-1029fce852d4. Driver/DLL Installation Via Odbcconf.EXE — Sigma Rule. Detects execution of "odbcconf" with "INSTALLDRIVER" which installs a new ODBC driver. Attackers abuse this to install and run malicious DLLs.

Rule metadata and linked tags

Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems). Source status: test; severity: medium. Source dates: 2023-05-22 / not supplied.

{
  "category": "process_creation",
  "product": "windows"
}

Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1

Source SHA-256: 01b31e8304cdaa548e4d0a00699b003046390a17360b361c25cc8a05a0bd4101

Detection logic

Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.

title: Driver/DLL Installation Via Odbcconf.EXE
id: 3f5491e2-8db8-496b-9e95-1029fce852d4
related:
    - id: cb0fe7c5-f3a3-484d-aa25-d350a7912729
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects execution of "odbcconf" with "INSTALLDRIVER" which installs a new ODBC driver. Attackers abuse this to install and run malicious DLLs.
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Odbcconf/
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20191023232753/https://twitter.com/Hexacorn/status/1187143326673330176
    - https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2020/08/23/odbcconf-lolbin-trifecta/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-22
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218.008
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\odbcconf.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'odbcconf.exe'
    selection_cli:
        # Note: The "/A" flag is not required to call a specific action
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'INSTALLDRIVER '
            - '.dll'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate driver DLLs being registered via "odbcconf" will generate false positives. Investigate the path of the DLL and its contents to determine if the action is authorized.
level: medium

Original YAML and metadata in JSON

False positives

  • Legitimate driver DLLs being registered via "odbcconf" will generate false positives. Investigate the path of the DLL and its contents to determine if the action is authorized.

Source references

Connected ecosystem references

Exact source-tagged techniques

Telemetry review

Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.

Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.