DNS Query Request By Regsvr32.EXE — Sigma Rule

Rule metadata and linked tags

Author: Dmitriy Lifanov, oscd.community. Source status: test; severity: medium. Source dates: 2019-10-25 / 2023-09-18.

{
  "category": "dns_query",
  "product": "windows"
}

Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1

Source SHA-256: 008f8752a0c8ee6be1939f8c7e0f27e9bf6b7d6504f923ee5823f624e57ba075

Detection logic

Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.

title: DNS Query Request By Regsvr32.EXE
id: 36e037c4-c228-4866-b6a3-48eb292b9955
related:
    - id: c7e91a02-d771-4a6d-a700-42587e0b1095
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects DNS queries initiated by "Regsvr32.exe"
references:
    - https://pentestlab.blog/2017/05/11/applocker-bypass-regsvr32/
    - https://oddvar.moe/2017/12/13/applocker-case-study-how-insecure-is-it-really-part-1/
author: Dmitriy Lifanov, oscd.community
date: 2019-10-25
modified: 2023-09-18
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1559.001
    - attack.t1218.010
logsource:
    category: dns_query
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\regsvr32.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

Original YAML and metadata in JSON

False positives

• Unknown

Source references

• https://pentestlab.blog/2017/05/11/applocker-bypass-regsvr32/
• https://oddvar.moe/2017/12/13/applocker-case-study-how-insecure-is-it-really-part-1/