1200KM / sigma-rule
Malicious Usage Of IMDS Credentials Outside Of AWS Infrastructure — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule 352a918a-34d8-4882-8470-44830c507aa3. Malicious Usage Of IMDS Credentials Outside Of AWS Infrastructure — Sigma Rule. Detects when an instance identity has taken an action that isn't inside SSM. This can indicate that a compromised EC2 instance is being used as a pivot point.
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: jamesc-grafana. Source status: test; severity: high. Source dates: 2024-07-11 / not supplied.
{
"product": "aws",
"service": "cloudtrail"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: b070399db57d212727d7f7873c642a0c1da0930c2b45a5fe8945c3e2474caf37
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Malicious Usage Of IMDS Credentials Outside Of AWS Infrastructure
id: 352a918a-34d8-4882-8470-44830c507aa3
status: test
description: |
Detects when an instance identity has taken an action that isn't inside SSM.
This can indicate that a compromised EC2 instance is being used as a pivot point.
references:
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/ec2-instance-identity-roles.html
- https://ermetic.com/blog/aws/aws-ec2-imds-what-you-need-to-know/
- https://www.packetmischief.ca/2023/07/31/amazon-ec2-credential-exfiltration-how-it-happens-and-how-to-mitigate-it/#lifting-credentials-from-imds-this-is-why-we-cant-have-nice-things
author: jamesc-grafana
date: 2024-07-11
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.initial-access
- attack.persistence
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1078
- attack.t1078.002
logsource:
product: aws
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection:
userIdentity.arn|re: '.+:assumed-role/aws:.+'
filter_main_generic:
- eventSource: 'ssm.amazonaws.com'
- eventName: 'RegisterManagedInstance'
- sourceIPAddress: 'AWS Internal'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- A team has configured an EC2 instance to use instance profiles that grant the option for the EC2 instance to talk to other AWS Services
level: high
False positives
- A team has configured an EC2 instance to use instance profiles that grant the option for the EC2 instance to talk to other AWS Services
Source references
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/ec2-instance-identity-roles.html
- https://ermetic.com/blog/aws/aws-ec2-imds-what-you-need-to-know/
- https://www.packetmischief.ca/2023/07/31/amazon-ec2-credential-exfiltration-how-it-happens-and-how-to-mitigate-it/#lifting-credentials-from-imds-this-is-why-we-cant-have-nice-things
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.