1200KM / sigma-rule
Hidden Powershell in Link File Pattern — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule 30e92f50-bb5a-4884-98b5-d20aa80f3d7a. Hidden Powershell in Link File Pattern — Sigma Rule. Detects events that appear when a user click on a link file with a powershell command in it
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: frack113. Source status: test; severity: medium. Source dates: 2022-02-06 / not supplied.
{
"category": "process_creation",
"product": "windows"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: c21b466ed575d7c97b32f1f4eef6e42d652d63302f81b6357d9ba78f71dd42d4
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Hidden Powershell in Link File Pattern
id: 30e92f50-bb5a-4884-98b5-d20aa80f3d7a
status: test
description: Detects events that appear when a user click on a link file with a powershell command in it
references:
- https://www.x86matthew.com/view_post?id=embed_exe_lnk
author: frack113
date: 2022-02-06
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
ParentImage: C:\Windows\explorer.exe
Image: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'powershell'
- '.lnk'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate commands in .lnk files
level: medium
False positives
- Legitimate commands in .lnk files
Source references
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.